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Generic Determinacy of Nash Equilibrium in Network Formation Games

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Author Info
Carlos Pimienta () (School of Economics, The University of New South Wales)

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Abstract

This paper shows that the set of probability distributions over networks induced by Nash equilibria of the network formation game proposed by Myerson (1991) is finite for a generic assignment of payoffs to networks. The same result can be extended to several variations of the game found in the literature.

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File URL: http://wwwdocs.fce.unsw.edu.au/economics/Research/WorkingPapers/2007_31.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by School of Economics, The University of New South Wales in its series Discussion Papers with number 2007-31.

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Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:swe:wpaper:2007-31

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Related research
Keywords: Networks; generic finiteness; Nash Equilibrium;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Calvo-Armengol, Antoni, 2004. "Job contact networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 191-206, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Nicolai S. Kukushkin & Cristian M. Litan & Francisco Marhuenda, 2007. "On the generic finiteness of outcome distributions for bimatrix game forms," Economics Working Papers we073520, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
  3. Venkatesh Bala & Sanjeev Goyal, 2000. "A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1181-1230, September.
  4. Jackson, Matthew O. & Watts, Alison, 2002. "The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 265-295, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Matthew O. Jackson, 2003. "A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency," Game Theory and Information 0303011, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Govindan, Srihari & McLennan, Andrew, 2001. "On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Game Forms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(2), pages 455-71, March.
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  7. De Sinopoli, Francesco, 2001. "On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcomes in Plurality Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 270-286, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2003. "On the Generic Strategic Stability of Nash Equilibria if Voting is Costly," CEIS Research Paper 41, Tor Vergata University, CEIS. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Rahmi Ilkiliç, 2005. "Pairwise-Stability and Nash Equilibria in Network Formation," Working Papers 2005.34, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Park, In-Uck, 1997. "Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions for Sender-Receiver Cheap-Talk Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 431-448, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Jackson, Matthew O. & Wolinsky, Asher, 1996. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 44-74, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Blume, Lawrence E & Zame, William R, 1994. "The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 783-94, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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