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Workers' Responses to Incentives: The Case of Pending MLB Free Agents

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Listed:
  • Joshua Congdon-Hohman

    (Department of Economics, College of the Holy Cross)

  • Jonathan A. Lanning

    (Department of Economics, Bryn Mawr)

Abstract

This study examines ways in which workers respond to implicit incentives. Specifically, we examine the extent to which workers shift their effort to activities that are measured and which have been previously rewarded in the labor market. To examine this question, we examine the changes in the performance measures of professional baseball players in the season prior to the opportunity to freely negotiate their contract (free agency). We will examine different eras in baseball to examine if we can identify changes in behavior in this pivotal year based on changes to the current premium outputs for each time period.

Suggested Citation

  • Joshua Congdon-Hohman & Jonathan A. Lanning, 2013. "Workers' Responses to Incentives: The Case of Pending MLB Free Agents," Working Papers 1301, International Association of Sports Economists;North American Association of Sports Economists.
  • Handle: RePEc:spe:wpaper:1301
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Agency theory; strategic performance; opportunistic behavior; baseball;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism

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