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To Bribe or Not to Bribe: Incentives to Protect Tanzania’s Forests

Author

Listed:
  • Robinson, Elizabeth J.Z.
  • Lokina, Razack B.

Abstract

Where participatory forest management has been introduced into Tanzania, “volunteer†patrollers take responsibility for enforcing access restrictions, often receiving a share of the fine revenue that they collect as an incentive. We explored how this shared revenue and alternative sources of forest products for villagers determine the effort patrollers put into enforcement and whether they choose to take a bribe from illegal harvesters rather than honestly reporting the illegal activity. Using an optimal enforcement model, we show that, without transparency or funds to pay and monitor the volunteers undertaking enforcement, policymakers face tradeoffs between efficiency, enforcement effectiveness, and revenue collection.

Suggested Citation

  • Robinson, Elizabeth J.Z. & Lokina, Razack B., 2009. "To Bribe or Not to Bribe: Incentives to Protect Tanzania’s Forests," RFF Working Paper Series dp-09-17-efd, Resources for the Future.
    • Handle: RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-09-17-efd
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    File URL: http://www.rff.org/RFF/documents/EfD-DP-09-17.rdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Nielsen, Martin Reinhardt & Treue, Thorsten, 2012. "Hunting for the Benefits of Joint Forest Management in the Eastern Afromontane Biodiversity Hotspot: Effects on Bushmeat Hunters and Wildlife in the Udzungwa Mountains," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(6), pages 1224-1239.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    optimal enforcement; participatory forest management; Tanzania;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • Q23 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Forestry

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