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Incentives and the Structure of Teams

Author

Listed:
  • Matt Mitchell

    (University of Toronto;)

  • Galina Vereshchagina

    (Arizona State University)

  • April Franco

    (University of Toronto;)

Abstract

may, on their own, generate monotone matching predictions in the absence of complementarities or anti-complementarities in production technology. We also derive sufficient conditions on the primitives of the model leading to the optimality of positive and negative matching of team members.

Suggested Citation

  • Matt Mitchell & Galina Vereshchagina & April Franco, 2009. "Incentives and the Structure of Teams," 2009 Meeting Papers 758, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  • Handle: RePEc:red:sed009:758
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    8. Franco, April Mitchell & Mitchell, Matthew & Vereshchagina, Galina, 2011. "Incentives and the structure of teams," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2307-2332.
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    1. Altinok Ahmet & Mac Donald Diana E., 2023. "Designing the Menu of Licenses for Foster Care," Working Papers 2023-19, Banco de México.
    2. Jian Wang & Xintian Zhuang & Jun Yang & Jiliang Sheng, 2014. "The effects of optimism bias in teams," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(32), pages 3980-3994, November.
    3. Ayça Kaya & Galina Vereshchagina, 2015. "Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(1), pages 73-121, September.
    4. Nana Adrian & Marc Möller, 2020. "Self‐managed work teams: An efficiency‐rationale for pay compression," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 315-334, April.
    5. Ashwin Kambhampati & Carlos Segura‐Rodriguez, 2022. "The optimal assortativity of teams inside the firm," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(3), pages 484-515, September.
    6. Galina Vereshchagina, 2017. "The Impact of Moral Hazard and Budget Balancing on Sorting in Partnerships," 2017 Meeting Papers 1452, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Bel, Roland & Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2015. "Team composition, worker effort and welfare," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 1-8.
    8. Bel, Roland & Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2012. "On Broadway and strip malls: how to make a winning team," Working Papers 2012-14, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
    9. Fu, Hui & Yang, Jun & An, Yunbi, 2019. "Made for each other: Perfect matching in venture capital markets," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 346-358.
    10. Ashwin Kambhampati & Carlos Segura-Rodriguez, 2020. "The Optimal Assortativity of Teams Inside the Firm," PIER Working Paper Archive 20-018, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    11. Thomas Gall & Xiaocheng Hu & Michael Vlassopoulos, 2019. "Dynamic incentive effects of assignment mechanisms: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(4), pages 687-712, November.
    12. Ferreira, Daniel & Nikolowa, Radoslawa, 2017. "Adverse Selection and Assortative Matching in Labor Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 11869, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Wang, Peng, 2020. "Superior firm performance under conditional communication between top hierarchy and the subordinates," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 516-526.
    14. Vereshchagina, Galina, 2019. "The role of individual financial contributions in the formation of entrepreneurial teams," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 173-193.
    15. Pu Chen & Sanxi Li & Bing Ye, 2018. "Risk†Sharing Matching And Moral Hazard," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(2), pages 165-174, April.
    16. Huseyin Yildirim, 2023. "Who fares better in teamwork?," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(2), pages 299-324, June.
    17. Franco, April Mitchell & Mitchell, Matthew & Vereshchagina, Galina, 2011. "Incentives and the structure of teams," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2307-2332.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production

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