This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Sovereign default risk with heterogenous borrowers

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Juan Carlos Hatchondo
Leonardo Martinez
Horacio Sapriza
Abstract

We study a standard quantitative model of sovereign default in which the government in a small open economy (SMO) decides how much to save and whether to default on its debt. In contrast with previous quantitative studies, we do not assume that a defaulting country is exogenously excluded from capital markets, and we assume that political parties with different discount factors alternate in power. Preliminary quantitative results indicate that even without assuming exogenous exclusion, after a default episode, the model generates difficulties in market access---in average, for the same level of debt, spreads are higher after default; due to this increase in borrowing costs, capital inflows are initially decreased, and recover slowly after that. We also describe the strategic interaction of governments with different patience

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://repec.org/sed2006/up.18193.1140057515.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2006 Meeting Papers with number 845.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 03 Dec 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:red:sed006:845

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Anne Stubing CV Starr Center for Applied Economics 269 Mercer Street, Room 303 New York University New York, NY 10003
Fax: 1-860-486-4463
Email:
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htm
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christian Zimmermann).

Related research
Keywords: Sovereign Default Strategic Behavior Endogenous Borrowing Constraints Markov Perfect Equilibrium.

Find related papers by JEL classification:
F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can create a compilation of all publications of a group of people, say alumni of a program, your students or memers of an association.

This page was last updated on 2008-11-20.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.