Johannes Hoerner () (Kellogg School of Management Northwestern University) Nicolas Vieille
Abstract
We analyze a version of Akerlof's market for lemons in which a sequence of buyers make offers to a long-lived seller endowed with a single unit for sale. We consider both the case in which previous offers are observable and the case in which they are not. When offers are observable, trade may only occur in the first period, so that the resulting inefficiency may be worse than in the static model. In the unobservable case, trade occurs with probability one eventually
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2006 Meeting Papers with number
813.
Length: Date of creation: 03 Dec 2006 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:red:sed006:813
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information