We show that price stickiness is predicted by the theory of second best, applied to a random- matching model of money. The economy is hit with iid, aggregate, preference shocks, and allocations are allowed to be history dependent. Due to individual anonymity and lack of commitment, implementable allocations must satisfy participation constraints. Price stickiness becomes necessary for optimality, in terms of average, ex-ante welfare, when aggregate uncen- tainty is present but not too severe, and the degree of patience is neither too low or too high. By applying mechanism design to an alternative economy with centralized markets, we also Þnd important that macroeconomic policies, such as the taxation of money holdings, are unable to implement the Þrst best for price stckiness to have a social role
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2006 Meeting Papers with number
738.
Length: Date of creation: 03 Dec 2006 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:red:sed006:738
Contact details of provider: Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Anne Stubing CV Starr Center for Applied Economics 269 Mercer Street, Room 303 New York University New York, NY 10003 Fax: 1-860-486-4463 Email: Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htm More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christian Zimmermann).
Find related papers by JEL classification: E10 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - General E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: