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Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2005 Meeting Papers with number 866.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:red:sed005:866

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Related research

Keywords: Optimal Auctions Multiple Objects Externalities Mechanism Design

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2005-12-01 (All new papers)
• NEP-GTH-2005-12-01 (Game Theory)
• NEP-MIC-2005-12-01 (Microeconomics)

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This page was last updated on 2008-11-16.