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A Dynamic Theory of Optimal Capital Structure and Executive Compensation

Author

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  • Harold Cole
  • Andrew Atkeson

Abstract

In this paper, we put forward a theory of the optimal capital structure of the firm based on Jensen's (1986) hypothesis that a firm's choice of capital structure is determined by a trade-off between agency costs and monitoring costs. The problem of determining the optimal capital structure of the firm as well as the optimal compensation of the manager is then a problem of choosing payments to outside investors and the manager at each stage of production to balance these two frictions. Our theory has the following implications regarding optimal capital structure and executive compensation. Each period, the payouts from the firm can be divided into payments to the manager that consist of a non-contingent base pay and a performance component of pay based on the realized output of the firm, and two distinct payments to the outside investors that resemble payments debt and outside equity respectively. In our model, the dynamics of the capital structure come from the dynamics of compensation

Suggested Citation

  • Harold Cole & Andrew Atkeson, 2004. "A Dynamic Theory of Optimal Capital Structure and Executive Compensation," 2004 Meeting Papers 267, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:sed004:267
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Mele, Antonio, 2014. "Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 69-85.
    2. Cao, Dan & Lorenzoni, Guido & Walentin, Karl, 2019. "Financial frictions, investment, and Tobin’s q," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 105-122.
    3. Harold Cole & Felix Kubler, 2012. "Recursive Contracts, Lotteries and Weakly Concave Pareto Sets," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 15(4), pages 479-500, October.
    4. Antoine L. Noël & Amy Hongfei Sun, 2021. "Information Transparency of Firm Financing," Working Paper 1459, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    5. Кокорева Мария Сергеевна & Степанова Анастасия Николаевна, 2012. "Financial architecture and corporate performance: evidence from Russia," Journal of Corporate Finance Research Корпоративные финансы, CyberLeninka;Федеральное государственное автономное образовательное учреждение высшего образования «Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики», issue 2 (22), pages 34-44.
    6. Harold L. Cole, 2008. "Self-Enforcing Stochastic Monitoring and the Separation of Debt and Equity Claims," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-025, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    7. Th'eo Durandard, 2023. "Dynamic delegation in promotion contests," Papers 2308.05668, arXiv.org.
    8. Syed Muhammad Javed & Agha Jahanzeb & Saif-ur-Rehman, 2012. "A Critical Review of Capital Structure Theories," Information Management and Business Review, AMH International, vol. 4(11), pages 553-557.
    9. Lustig, Hanno & Syverson, Chad & Van Nieuwerburgh, Stijn, 2011. "Technological change and the growing inequality in managerial compensation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 601-627, March.
    10. Karl Walentin & Guido Lorenzoni & Dan Cao, 2013. "Financial Frictions, Investment and Tobin’s q," 2013 Meeting Papers 634, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    11. Daniel F. Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2012. "Managerial Turnover in a Changing World," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(5), pages 879-925.
    12. Popescu Luigi & Visinescu Sorin, 2009. "A Review Of The Capital Structure Theories," Annals of Faculty of Economics, University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics, vol. 3(1), pages 315-320, May.
    13. Visinescu, Sorin & Micuda, Dan, 2009. "Some aspects regarding the financial structure theories," MPRA Paper 30412, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    outside debt and equity; base pay; performance bonus; golden parachutte;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
    • E13 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Neoclassical

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