This paper investigates the effect of asymmetric information on the annuities market when individuals differ in the probability of dying. Individual behaviour under live-insured and term-insured annuities is investigated. Unlike well-known results of Rothschild and Stiglitz, if an equilibrium exists, it must be a pooling equilibrium. Given the same information as the private sector, a planner can achieve an optimum under certain circumstances.
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Paper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
652.
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