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Manipulations and repeated games in future markets

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  • Chichilnisky, Graciela

Abstract

This chapter analyzes the possibility of manipulation in futures markets, concentrating on the effects that manipulation may have on their informational efficiency . We use the concept of manipulation as it arises in the study of noncooperative games with imperfect information . The problem can be summarized as follows : disclosure that is, (less anonymity) may prevent manipulation and therefore improve the informational efficiency of the market . On the other hand, disclosure (less anonymity) may restrict entry, and therefore produce an efficiency loss. There is, in this sense, a tradeoff between informational efficiency and free entry.

Suggested Citation

  • Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1984. "Manipulations and repeated games in future markets," MPRA Paper 8083, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:8083
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Graciela Chichilnisky, 1982. "Social Aggregation Rules and Continuity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 97(2), pages 337-352.
    2. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1982. "The topological equivalence of the pareto condition and the existence of a dictator," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 223-233, March.
    3. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    futures; efficiency; futures markets; games; game theory; manipulation; imperfect information; disclosure; repeated games; one-shot game;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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