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Incentivos en selección adversa para el control del acceso a espacios naturales protegidos
[Incentives under adverse selection for the management of natural protected spaces]

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  • Fuentes Castro, Daniel

Abstract

The deterioration of protected natural areas due to over-visiting is a frequent situation. In this article we modelize the management of access to such places in an adverse selection setting. The regulator offers each visitor a contract based on a limited right of access together with a monetary transfer; both right and transfer depend on the personal valuation of the natural place by each visitor. The aggregation of the limited rights of access respects the congestion capacity of the natural area. The visitors then have two possibilities: to decide the length of their visit or to reduce it in exchange for a green tax deduction. In both cases none of the visitors is denied access to the protected natural area, even when some visitors refuse the contract. The regulation cost can be financed by a price of entry or by a public budget. In the first case, the income effect of the contracts has to be taken into account, while in the second case a paradoxical question can emerge: how much taxpayers are willing to finance the conservation of protected natural areas that they consider places of exceptional interest.

Suggested Citation

  • Fuentes Castro, Daniel, 2005. "Incentivos en selección adversa para el control del acceso a espacios naturales protegidos [Incentives under adverse selection for the management of natural protected spaces]," MPRA Paper 51754, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:51754
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ecotasas; selección adversa; contratos; bienes comunes; medio ambiente; exclusión; incentivos;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General

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