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Which way to cooperate

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  • Kaplan, Todd
  • Ruffle, Bradley

Abstract

Cooperation in real-world dilemmas takes many forms. We introduce a class of two-player games that permits two distinct ways to cooperate in the repeated game. One way to cooperate is to play cutoff strategies, which rely solely on a player's private value to defection. The second cooperative strategy is to take turns, which relies on publicly available information. Our initial experiments reveal that almost all cooperators adopt cutoff strategies. However, follow-up experiments in which the distribution of values to defection are made more similar show that all cooperators now take turns. Our results offer insight into what form a cooperative norm will take: for mundane tasks or where individuals otherwise have similar payoffs, taking turns is likely; for difficult tasks that differentiate individuals by skill or by preferences, cutoff cooperation will emerge.

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  • Kaplan, Todd & Ruffle, Bradley, 2007. "Which way to cooperate," MPRA Paper 3381, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:3381
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    Cited by:

    1. John Duffy & Ernest K. Lai & Wooyoung Lim, 2017. "Coordination via correlation: an experimental study," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(2), pages 265-304, August.
    2. Zhao, Shuchen, 2021. "Taking turns in continuous time," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 257-279.
    3. Hans-Theo Normann & Brian Wallace, 2012. "The impact of the termination rule on cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma experiment," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(3), pages 707-718, August.
    4. Kloosterman, Andrew & Mago, Shakun, 2023. "The infinitely repeated volunteer's dilemma: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 812-832.
    5. Luhan, Wolfgang J. & Poulsen, Anders U. & Roos, Michael W.M., 2017. "Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 687-699.
    6. Timothy Cason & Sau-Him Lau & Vai-Lam Mui, 2013. "Learning, teaching, and turn taking in the repeated assignment game," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(2), pages 335-357, October.
    7. Doğan, Gönül, 2018. "Collusion in a buyer–seller network formation game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 445-457.
    8. Konstantinos Georgalos & Indrajit Ray & Sonali SenGupta, 2020. "Nash versus coarse correlation," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(4), pages 1178-1204, December.
    9. Chakravarty, Surajeet & Kaplan, Todd R. & Myles, Gareth, 2018. "When costly voting is beneficial," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 33-42.
    10. Louis, Philippos & Troumpounis, Orestis & Tsakas, Nikolas & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2022. "Coordination with preferences over the coalition size," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 194(C), pages 105-123.
    11. Lisa Bruttel & Werner Güth, 2018. "Asymmetric voluntary cooperation: a repeated sequential best-shot experiment," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(3), pages 873-891, September.
    12. Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Roy, Nilanjan, 2019. "Path of intertemporal cooperation and limits to turn-taking behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 21-36.
    13. Kaplan, Todd R. & Ruffle, Bradley J. & Shtudiner, Zeev, 2018. "Cooperation through coordination in two stages," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 206-219.
    14. Tjaša Bjedov & Thierry Madiès & Marie Claire Villeval, 2016. "Communication And Coordination In A Two-Stage Game," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(3), pages 1519-1540, July.
    15. Eyal Winter & Luciano Méndez-Naya & Ignacio García-Jurado, 2017. "Mental Equilibrium and Strategic Emotions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(5), pages 1302-1317, May.
    16. Georgalos, Konstantinos & Ray, Indrajit & Gupta, Sonali Sen, 2019. "Nash vs. Coarse Correlation," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2019/3, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
    17. Todd R. Kaplan & Bradley J. Ruffle & Ze’ev Shtudiner, 2013. "Waiting To Cooperate?," Working Papers 1314, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    18. Dirk Engelmann & Veronika Grimm, 2006. "Overcoming Incentive Constraints? The (In-)effectiveness of Social Interaction," Working Paper Series in Economics 22, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
    19. Todd Cherry & Stephen Cotten & Stephan Kroll, 2013. "Heterogeneity, Coordination and the Provision of Best-Shot Public Goods," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 16(4), pages 497-510, December.
    20. Todd Kaplan, Bradley Ruffle, 2015. "Waiting to Cooperate? Cooperation in one-stage and two-stage games," LCERPA Working Papers 0095, Laurier Centre for Economic Research and Policy Analysis, revised 16 Sep 2015.
    21. Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Roy, Nilanjan, 2017. "It's your turn: experiments with three-player public good games," MPRA Paper 76565, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    22. Sau-Him Lau & Vai-Lam Mui, 2012. "Using turn taking to achieve intertemporal cooperation and symmetry in infinitely repeated 2 × 2 games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(2), pages 167-188, February.
    23. Sibly, Hugh & Tisdell, John, 2018. "Cooperation and turn taking in finitely-repeated prisoners' dilemmas: An experimental analysis," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 49-56.
    24. Leo, Greg, 2017. "Taking turns," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 525-547.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    experimental economics; cooperation; incomplete information; alternating; cutoff strategies; random payoffs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General

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