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Noncompliance a major threat in fisheries management-Experiences from the artisanal coastal fisheries of Bangladesh

Author

Listed:
  • Viswanathan, K. Kuperan
  • Jahan, K.M.

Abstract

Non-compliance with regulation is a major problem that undermines the effectiveness of the coastal fisheries management in Bangladesh. The result of non-compliance with regulation is over fishing, resource depletion, habitat degradation and resource use conflicts. From a management perspective, it is important to examine the level and causes of non-compliance and explore policies for encouraging or securing compliance. An attempt has been made in this study to investigate these issues in the case of the marine fisheries of Bangladesh. The specific area of interest is the mesh size regulation. Result showed an absolute violation of the mesh size regulation. The study found that the opportunity of getting higher catches and economic returns, weak enforcement, influence of the social environment, ignorance about the law and limited livelihood opportunities are the main causes behind the noncompliance of the fishers with respect to mesh size regulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Viswanathan, K. Kuperan & Jahan, K.M., 2010. "Noncompliance a major threat in fisheries management-Experiences from the artisanal coastal fisheries of Bangladesh," MPRA Paper 32330, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2011.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:32330
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/32330/1/MPRA_paper_32330.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jon G. Sutinen & Peder Andersen, 1985. "The Economics of Fisheries Law Enforcement," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 64(4), pages 387-397.
    2. Salayo, Nerissa & Garces, Len & Pido, Michael & Viswanathan, Kuperan & Pomeroy, Robert & Ahmed, Mahfuzuddin & Siason, Ida & Seng, Keang & Masae, Awae, 2008. "Managing excess capacity in small-scale fisheries: Perspectives from stakeholders in three Southeast Asian countries," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 692-700, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Tanjina Akter Tima & Petra Schneider & Swapan Kumar Chanda & Mohammad Mojibul Hoque Mozumder & Mohammad Mosarof Hossain & Amany Begum & Md. Mostafa Shamsuzzaman, 2021. "Analyses Implementation Realities of Legal Frameworks for Sustainable Management of Tanguar Haor Fisheries Resources in Bangladesh," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(16), pages 1-18, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Noncompliance; Estuarine Set Bag Net; Marine Set Bag Net; Small Mesh Drift Net; Coastal fisheries; Policies for compliance management; Co-management; Bangladesh.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
    • Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation

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