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Endogenous Timing with Government's Preference and Privatization

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Author Info
Kangsik, Choi
Abstract

By introducing the government's preference for tax revenues into an extended game with observable delay, this study provides new insight into the trade-off between the government and the public firm's payoff in a government's optimal policy of privatization. The results show that: (i) regardless of the government's preference for tax revenues, the government does not have an incentive to privatize in an endogenous timing context even though there are conflicts of interest between the public firm and the government and (ii) under a mixed duopoly, each sequential-move equilibrium varies with the level of the government's preference for tax revenues.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13844/
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 13844.

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Date of creation: 07 Mar 2009
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:13844

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Related research
Keywords: Government's Preference; Extended Game; Tax; Privatization.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Brülhart, Marius & Jametti, Mario, 2007. "Does Tax Competition Tame the Leviathan?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6512, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Zax, Jeffrey S, 1989. "Is There a Leviathan in Your Neighborhood?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 560-67, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Bibhas Saha & Rudra Sensarma, 2008. "The Distributive Role of Managerial Incentives in a Mixed Duopoly," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 12(28), pages 1-10. [Downloadable!]
  4. Forbes, Kevin F & Zampelli, Ernest M, 1989. "Is Leviathan a Mythical Beast?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 568-77, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Michael J. Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2002. "Does Federalism Lead to Excessively High Taxes?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 363-370, March. [Downloadable!]
  6. Pal, Debashis, 1998. "Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 181-185, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Toshihiro Matsumura, 2003. "Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly with a Foreign Competitor," Bulletin of Economic Research, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(3), pages 275-287, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Michael Rauscher, 2000. "Interjurisdictional Competition and Public-Sector Prodigality: The Triumph of the Market over the State?," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 57(1), pages 89-, September.
  9. Jacques, Armel, 2004. "Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly: a forgotten equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 147-148, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Juan Bárcena-Ruiz, 2007. "Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly: Price Competition," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 91(3), pages 263-272, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Mujumdar, Sudesh & Pal, Debashis, 1998. "Effects of indirect taxation in a mixed oligopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 199-204, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-14.

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