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Die Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie als Erklärungsinstrumentarium von Korruption: Angewendet auf den Praxisfall „Siemens“

Author

Listed:
  • B. Michael Gilroy

    (University of Paderborn)

  • Daniel Kruse

    (University of Paderborn)

Abstract

Zunehmend wird Korruption aus einem wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Verständnis betrachtet und erklärt. Als besonders ergiebiges Instrumentarium zur Erklärung von Korruptionsfällen hat sich die Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie bewährt. In diesem Artikel wird die Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie allgemein und theoretisch vorgestellt und anschließend auf den Praxisfall Siemens angewendet

Suggested Citation

  • B. Michael Gilroy & Daniel Kruse, 2011. "Die Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie als Erklärungsinstrumentarium von Korruption: Angewendet auf den Praxisfall „Siemens“," Working Papers CIE 34, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:pdn:ciepap:34
    as

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    File URL: http://groups.uni-paderborn.de/wp-wiwi/RePEc/pdf/ciepap/WP34.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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