I begin by describing some of the problems of the simultaneous ascending auction. Then I present the package clock auction, which retains the benefits, while addressing the weaknesses, of the simultaneous ascending auction. I emphasize two essential elements of the package clock auction: the pricing rule and the activity rule. Along the way, I summarize both experimental and field results with the package clock auction.
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Paper provided by University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton in its series Papers of Peter Cramton with number
09add.
Length: 32 pages Date of creation: 2009 Date of revision:
2009 Publication status: Published in Jan Kramer and Stefan Seifert (eds.), Communications Regulation in the Age of Digital Convergence: Legal and Economic Perspectives, Karlsruhe, Germany: Karlsruhe Institute of Technology Handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:09add
Contact details of provider: Postal: Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211 Phone: (202) 318-0520 Fax: (202) 318-0520 Web page: http://www.cramton.umd.edu
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
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