Elected Officials’ Opportunistic Behavior on Third-Party Punishment: An experimental Analysis
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- Natalia Jiménez & Ángel Solano-García, 2015. "Elected Officials’ Opportunistic Behavior on Third-Party Punishment: An Experimental Analysis," Working Papers. Serie EC 2015-04, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
Opportunism; Punishment; Public Goods Games; Voting; Experiments.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2017-01-08 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2017-01-08 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2017-01-08 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2017-01-08 (Positive Political Economics)
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