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Technology sharing incentives for monopolistic firms

Author

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  • Takahiro Ishii

    (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University)

Abstract

The present study examines the effects of free technology sharing by a monopolistic final-good firm with other final-good firms. To this end, we consider two cases-first, where there exists one final-good firm in the final-good market and second, where there exist two final-good firms in the final-good market. Considering the free entry into the differentiated intermediate-goods market , the results of this study show that, when another firm enters the final-good market and transforms it into a two-firm oligopoly, cost efficiency improves because of an increase in the number of intermediate-goods firms. Furthermore, there is a possibility that the incumbent firm fs profits increases not only for a two-firm oligopoly, but also for an oligopoly with three or more firms. Thus, sharing technology for free could improve the profits of incumbent firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Takahiro Ishii, 2021. "Technology sharing incentives for monopolistic firms," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 21-05, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:osk:wpaper:2105
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monopolistic competition; Endogenous variety of intermediate goods; T echnology sharing; Intermediate goods; Technology transfer;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L16 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics; Macroeconomic Industrial Structure

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