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Theoretical Comparisons of Electoral Systems

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Roger B. Myerson

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Abstract

Elements of an economic theory of political institutions are introduced. A variety of electoral systems are reviewed. Cox's threshold is shown to measure incentives for diversity and specialization of candidates' positions, when the number of serious candidates is given. Duverger's law and its generalizations are discussed, to predict the number of serious candidates. Duberger's law is interpreted as a statement about electoral barriers to entry, and this idea is linked to the question of the effectiveness of democratic competition as a deterrent to political corruption. The impact ofpost-electoral bargaining on the party structure in presidential and parliamentary systems is discussed.

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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1261.

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Date of creation: Sep 1998
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1261

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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  1. Daniel Diermeier & Roger B. Myerson, 1995. "Lobbying and Incentives for Legislative Organization," Discussion Papers 1134, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  2. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey., 1987. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," Working Papers 643, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  3. Alessandro Lizzeri & Nicola Persico, 2001. "The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 225-239, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Roger B. Myerson & Robert J. Weber, 1988. "A Theory of Voting Equilibria," Discussion Papers 782, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. AURIOL, Emmanuelle & GARY-BOBO, Robert, 2008. "On the Optimal Number of Representatives," IDEI Working Papers 86, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Hendriks, Jean & Lockwood, Ben, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability : Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 729, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Stefano Gagliarducci & Tommaso Nannicini & Paolo Naticchioni, 2007. "Electoral Rules And Politicians' Behavior: A Micro Test," Working Papers wp2007_0716, CEMFI. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Massimo Morelli, 2001. "Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems," Economics Working Papers 0018, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
  5. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1998. "The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative Politics with Rational Politicians," NBER Working Papers 6848, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Anand Swamy & Stephen Knack & Young Lee & Omar Azfar, 2000. "Gender and Corruption," Center for Development Economics 158, Department of Economics, Williams College. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Richard A. Chisik & Robert J. Lemke, 2004. "When Winning is the Only Thing: Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in a Three-Candidate Spatial Voting Model," Working Papers 0407, Florida International University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Casey B. Mulligan & Kevin K. Tsui, 2006. "Political Competitiveness," NBER Working Papers 12653, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Rafael Hortala-Vallve, 2007. "Qualitative Voting," Economics Series Working Papers 320, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Juan Carlos Berganza, 2000. "Politicians, voters and electoral processes: an overview," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 24(3), pages 501-543, September. [Downloadable!]
  11. Castanheira, Micael, 2002. "Why Vote for Losers?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3404, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Jessica Seddon Wallack & Alejandro Gaviria & Ugo Panizza & Ernesto H. Stein, 2002. "Particularismo político alrededor del mundo," RES Working Papers 4290, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  13. Coate, Stephen & Knight, Brian, 2007. "Socially Optimal Districting: A Theoretical and Empirical Exploration," Working Papers 07-06, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Heckelman, Jac & Knack, Stephen, 2005. "Foreign aid and market-liberalizing reform," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3557, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Stephen Coate & Brian Knight, 2005. "Socially Optimal Districting," NBER Working Papers 11462, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Gerdes, Christer & Wadensjö, Eskil, 2008. "The Impact of Immigration on Election Outcomes in Danish Municipalities," IZA Discussion Papers 3586, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  17. Antonio Merlo, 2005. "Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Dec 2005. [Downloadable!]
  18. Jessica Seddon Wallack & Alejandro Gaviria & Ugo Panizza & Ernesto H. Stein, 2002. "Political Particularism around the World," RES Working Papers 4289, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
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