IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/30927.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Do Conflict of Interests Disclosures Work? Evidence from Citations in Medical Journals

Author

Listed:
  • Christian Leuz
  • Anup Malani
  • Maximilian Muhn
  • Laszlo Jakab

Abstract

Financial ties between drug companies and medical researchers are thought to bias studies published in medical journals. To enable readers to account for such bias, most medical journals require authors to disclose potential conflicts of interest. We examine whether disclosure reduces article citations, indicating a discount. A challenge to estimating this effect is selection as drug companies may seek out higher quality authors. Our analysis confirms this positive association. Including observable controls for article and author quality attenuates but does not eliminate this relation. We perform three tests. First, we show that the positive association is weaker for review articles, which are more susceptible to bias. Second, we examine article recommendations to family physicians among articles that are a priori more homogenous in quality. We find a significantly negative association between disclosure and expert recommendations, consistent with discounting. Third, we conduct an analysis within author and article, exploiting journal policy changes that result in conflict disclosure by an author. We examine the effect of this disclosure on citations to a previously published article by the same author. This analysis reveals a negative citation effect. Overall, our evidence is consistent with the notion that other researchers discount articles with disclosed conflicts.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Leuz & Anup Malani & Maximilian Muhn & Laszlo Jakab, 2023. "Do Conflict of Interests Disclosures Work? Evidence from Citations in Medical Journals," NBER Working Papers 30927, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:30927
    Note: CF EH LE
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w30927.pdf
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at http://www.nber.org/wwphelp.html. Free access is also available to older working papers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. George J. Borjas & Kirk B. Doran, 2021. "The Collapse Of The Soviet Union And The Productivity Of American Mathematicians," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Foundational Essays in Immigration Economics, chapter 11, pages 313-373, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Khaled Shawwa & Romy Kallas & Serge Koujanian & Arnav Agarwal & Ignacio Neumann & Paul Alexander & Kari A O Tikkinen & Gordon Guyatt & Elie A Akl, 2016. "Requirements of Clinical Journals for Authors’ Disclosure of Financial and Non-Financial Conflicts of Interest: A Cross Sectional Study," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(3), pages 1-12, March.
    3. Daron Acemoglu & Joshua Linn, 2004. "Market Size in Innovation: Theory and Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(3), pages 1049-1090.
    4. Azoulay, Pierre & Bonatti, Alessandro & Krieger, Joshua L., 2017. "The career effects of scandal: Evidence from scientific retractions," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(9), pages 1552-1569.
    5. Matt Marx & Aaron Fuegi, 2020. "Reliance on science: Worldwide front‐page patent citations to scientific articles," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(9), pages 1572-1594, September.
    6. Michaely, Roni & Womack, Kent L, 1999. "Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Underwriter Analyst Recommendations," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(4), pages 653-686.
    7. Christian Leuz & Peter D. Wysocki, 2016. "The Economics of Disclosure and Financial Reporting Regulation: Evidence and Suggestions for Future Research," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2), pages 525-622, May.
    8. Eric Budish & Benjamin N. Roin & Heidi Williams, 2015. "Do Firms Underinvest in Long-Term Research? Evidence from Cancer Clinical Trials," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(7), pages 2044-2085, July.
    9. Daylian M. Cain & George Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, 2005. "The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 1-25, January.
    10. Anup Agrawal & Mark A. Chen, 2008. "Do Analyst Conflicts Matter? Evidence from Stock Recommendations," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(3), pages 503-537, August.
    11. Sangiorgi, Francesco & Spatt, Chester, 2017. "The Economics of Credit Rating Agencies," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 12(1), pages 1-116, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Leila Agha & Soomi Kim & Danielle Li, 2020. "Insurance Design and Pharmaceutical Innovation," NBER Working Papers 27563, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Jeremy Burke & Angela A. Hung & Jack Clift & Steven Garber & Joanne K. Yoong, 2015. "Impacts of Conflicts of Interest in the Financial Services Industry," Working Papers WR-1076, RAND Corporation.
    3. Alan Crane & Kevin Crotty, 2020. "How Skilled Are Security Analysts?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(3), pages 1629-1675, June.
    4. Glenn Boyle & Graeme Guthrie & Luke Gorton, 2010. "Holding onto Your Horses: Conflicts of Interest in Asset Management," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(4), pages 689-713.
    5. Gamba, Simona & Magazzini, Laura & Pertile, Paolo, 2021. "R&D and market size: Who benefits from orphan drug legislation?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    6. S Scott Graham & Zoltan P Majdik & Dave Clark & Molly M Kessler & Tristin Brynn Hooker, 2020. "Relationships among commercial practices and author conflicts of interest in biomedical publishing," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(7), pages 1-11, July.
    7. Ralph Koijen & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, 2018. "Financing the War on Cancer," NBER Working Papers 24730, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Heidi L. Williams, 2016. "Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation: Evidence from Health Care Markets," Innovation Policy and the Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 53-87.
    9. Daniel Arand & Alexander G. Kerl, 2015. "Sell†Side Analyst Research and Reported Conflicts of Interest," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 21(1), pages 20-51, January.
    10. Fabian Gaessler & Stefan Wagner, 2022. "Patents, Data Exclusivity, and the Development of New Drugs," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 104(3), pages 571-586, May.
    11. Mark Pauly & Kyle Myers, 2016. "A Ricardian-Demand Explanation for Changing Pharmaceutical R&D Productivity," NBER Working Papers 22720, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Michael Kremer & Christopher M. Snyder, 2018. "Preventives Versus Treatments Redux: Tighter Bounds on Distortions in Innovation Incentives with an Application to the Global Demand for HIV Pharmaceuticals," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 53(1), pages 235-273, August.
    13. Dambra, Michael & Field, Laura Casares & Gustafson, Matthew T. & Pisciotta, Kevin, 2018. "The consequences to analyst involvement in the IPO process: Evidence surrounding the JOBS Act," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 302-330.
    14. Xu, Nianhang & Jiang, Xuanyu & Chan, Kam C. & Yi, Zhihong, 2013. "Analyst coverage, optimism, and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 217-239.
    15. Jeffrey Clemens & Stan Veuger, 2017. "Risks To The Returns To Medical Innovation: The Case Of Myriad Genetics," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(2), pages 345-357, April.
    16. Elizabeth Devos & Erik Devos & Seow Eng Ong & Andrew C. Spieler, 2019. "Are REIT Investors Overly Optimistic after Equity Offerings?: Evidence from Analyst Forecast Errors," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 148-165, August.
    17. Thabang Mokoaleli-Mokoteli & Richard J. Taffler & Vineet Agarwal, 2009. "Behavioural Bias and Conflicts of Interest in Analyst Stock Recommendations," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3-4), pages 384-418.
    18. Hanousek, Jan & Kopřiva, František, 2013. "Do broker/analyst conflicts matter? Detecting evidence from internet trading platforms," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 86-92.
    19. Ufuk Akcigit & John Grigsby & Tom Nicholas, 2017. "The Rise of American Ingenuity: Innovation and Inventors of the Golden Age," NBER Working Papers 23047, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Felix Gottschalk, 2021. "Regulating Markets with Advice: An Experimental Study," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 83(1), pages 1-31, February.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • M40 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - General
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:30927. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.