IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/28683.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Combating Political Corruption with Policy Bundles

Author

Listed:
  • Frederico Finan
  • Maurizio Mazzocco

Abstract

In this paper, we develop a dynamic model of politicians who can engage in corruption. The model offers important insights into what determines corruption and how to design policy to combat it. We estimate the model using data from Brazil to measure voters' willingness to pay for various commonly-proposed anti-corruption policies, such as increasing audit probabilities, increasing politicians' wages, and extending term limits. We document that while voters have a high willingness to pay for audit policies, due to their effectiveness in reducing corruption, a multi-pronged approach that bundles certain policies can achieve similar welfare gains at a fraction of the cost.

Suggested Citation

  • Frederico Finan & Maurizio Mazzocco, 2021. "Combating Political Corruption with Policy Bundles," NBER Working Papers 28683, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28683
    Note: DEV POL
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w28683.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gustavo J. Bobonis & Paul Gertler & Marco Gonzalez-Navarro & Simeon Nichter, 2023. "Does Combating Corruption Reduce Clientelism?," NBER Working Papers 31266, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Chen, Shuai & Ge, Erqi, 2022. "The Anti-Corruption Campaign and the Inter-Generational Transmission of Working in Bureaucracy: Evidence from China," GLO Discussion Paper Series 1159, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    3. Chen, Shuai & Ge, Erqi, 2022. "The Anti-Corruption Campaign and the Inter-Generational Transmission of Working in Bureaucracy: Evidence from China," IZA Discussion Papers 15569, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28683. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.