IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/2733.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Are Estimated Tax Elasticities Really Just Tax Evasion Elasticities? The Case of Charitable Contributions

Author

Listed:
  • Joel Slemrod

Abstract

Tax return data, which has been a principal source for econometric investigations of the behavioral response to tax policy, is subject to misreporting that may bias estimates of tax responsiveness. The misreporting arises because understatement of taxable income may itself be a function of an individuals marginal tax rate, it being the return to a dollar of understated taxable income. To the extent that misreporting of income and deductions is a function of the same factors that determine the behavior under study, estimated relationships based on reported data will reveal a composite of the tax (and income) responsiveness of the actual behavior and of the misreporting of the behavior. This paper used data from tax returns that have been subject to intensive audits to confront the quantitative importance of misreporting for the estimated tax responsiveness of charitable contributions. This has been the subject of numerous empirical studies using tax return data which use a common empirical framework. It concludes that the tax responsiveness of charitable giving that has been detected using tax return data cannot be ascribed to the tax responsiveness of overstating actual giving In fact. overstatement is apparently less price responsive than actual giving, implying that the responsiveness of actual giving is higher than is suggested by studying reported contributions.

Suggested Citation

  • Joel Slemrod, 1988. "Are Estimated Tax Elasticities Really Just Tax Evasion Elasticities? The Case of Charitable Contributions," NBER Working Papers 2733, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:2733
    Note: PE
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w2733.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 1974. "Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 201-202, May.
    2. Clotfelter, Charles T, 1983. "Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 65(3), pages 363-373, August.
    3. Reece, William S & Zieschang, Kimberly D, 1985. "Consistent Estimation of the Impact of Tax Deductibility on the Level of Charitable Contributions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 271-293, March.
    4. Poterba, James M, 1987. "Tax Evasion and Capital Gains Taxation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 234-239, May.
    5. Pitt, Mark M., 1981. "Smuggling and price disparity," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 447-458, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Basil Dalamagas, 2011. "A Dynamic Approach to Tax Evasion," Public Finance Review, , vol. 39(2), pages 309-326, March.
    2. Hannelore Weck-Hannemann & Werner W. Pommerehne, 1989. "Einkommensteuerhinterziehung in der Schweiz: Eine empirische Analyse," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 125(IV), pages 515-556, December.
    3. Judith Panadés, 2004. "Tax Evasion and Relative Tax Contribution," Public Finance Review, , vol. 32(2), pages 183-195, March.
    4. Amedeo Piolatto & Matthew D. Rablen, 2017. "Prospect theory and tax evasion: a reconsideration of the Yitzhaki puzzle," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 82(4), pages 543-565, April.
    5. Landsman, Wayne R. & Shackelford, Douglas A. & Yetman, Robert J., 2002. "The determinants of capital gains tax compliance: evidence from the RJR Nabisco leveraged buyout," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 47-74, April.
    6. Lee, Kangoh, 2001. "Tax evasion and self-insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 73-81, July.
    7. Panades, Judith, 2001. "Tax evasion and Ricardian equivalence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 799-815, November.
    8. Eduardo Engel & James R. Hines Jr., 1998. "Understanding Tax Evasion Dynamics," Documentos de Trabajo 47, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    9. Mukhtar Ali & H. Cecil & James Knoblett, 2001. "The effects of tax rates and enforcement policies on taxpayer compliance: A study of self-employed taxpayers," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 29(2), pages 186-202, June.
    10. Kim, Youngse, 2003. "Income distribution and equilibrium multiplicity in a stigma-based model of tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1591-1616, August.
    11. Nipoli Kamdar, 1997. "Corporate income tax compliance: A time series analysis," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 25(1), pages 37-49, March.
    12. Jordi Caball?Author-Email: Jordi.Caballe@uab.es & Judith Panad?, 2001. "On the Relation between Tax Rates and Evasion in a Multi-period Economy," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 500.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    13. Torgler, Benno & Schneider, Friedrich & Schaltegger, Christoph A., 2007. "With or Against the People? The Impact of a Bottom-Up Approach on Tax Morale and the Shadow Economy," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt6331x6vz, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    14. Traxler, Christian, 2010. "Social norms and conditional cooperative taxpayers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 89-103, March.
    15. Orviska, Marta & Hudson, John, 2003. "Tax evasion, civic duty and the law abiding citizen," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 83-102, March.
    16. Berger, Melissa & Fellner-Röhling, Gerlinde & Sausgruber, Rupert & Traxler, Christian, 2016. "Higher taxes, more evasion? Evidence from border differentials in TV license fees," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 74-86.
    17. Laszlo Goerke, 2003. "Tax Evasion and Tax Progressivity," Public Finance Review, , vol. 31(2), pages 189-203, March.
    18. Justin Marion & Erich Muehlegger, 2008. "Measuring Illegal Activity and the Effects of Regulatory Innovation: Tax Evasion and the Dyeing of Untaxed Diesel," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(4), pages 633-666, August.
    19. Joseph G. Eisenhauer, 2006. "The Shadow Price of Morality," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 32(3), pages 437-456, Summer.
    20. Raymond Fisman & Shang-Jin Wei, 2004. "Tax Rates and Tax Evasion: Evidence from "Missing Imports" in China," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(2), pages 471-500, April.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:2733. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.