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The Mystique Surrounding the Central Bank's Balance Sheet, Applied to the European Crisis

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  • Ricardo Reis

Abstract

In spite of the mystique behind a central bank's balance sheet, its resource constraint bounds the dividends it can distribute by the present value of seignorage, which is a modest share of GDP. Moreover, the statutes of the Federal Reserve or the ECB make it difficult for it to redistribute resources across regions. In a simple model of sovereign default, where multiple equilibria arise if debt repudiation lowers fiscal surpluses, the central bank may help to select one equilibrium. The central bank's main lever over fundamentals is to raise inflation, but otherwise the balance sheet gives it little leeway.

Suggested Citation

  • Ricardo Reis, 2013. "The Mystique Surrounding the Central Bank's Balance Sheet, Applied to the European Crisis," NBER Working Papers 18730, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18730
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 1998. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 587-597, June.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems

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