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A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Business Cycles and Price Wars During Booms

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  • Julio J. Rotemberg
  • Garth Saloner

Abstract

This paper studies implicitly colluding oligopolists facing fluctuating demand. The credible threat of future punishments provides the discipline that facilitates collusion. However, we find that the temptation to unilaterally deflate from the collusive outcome is often greater when demand is high. To moderate this temptation,the optimizing oligopoly reduces its profitability at such times,resulting in lower prices. If the oligopolists' output is an input to other sectors, their output may increase too. This explains the co-movements of outputs which characterize business cycles. The behavior of the railroads in the 1880's, the automobile industry in the 1950's and the cyclical behavior of cement prices and price-cost margins support our theory. (J.E.L. Classification numbers:020, 130, 610).

Suggested Citation

  • Julio J. Rotemberg & Garth Saloner, 1984. "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Business Cycles and Price Wars During Booms," NBER Working Papers 1412, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:1412
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Interpreting information, markups, and the economic cycle
      by Matt Nolan in TVHE on 2012-09-05 00:00:52

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    6. Kollmann, Robert, 1997. "The cyclical behavior of mark ups in U.S. manufacturing and trade: new empirical evidence based on a model of optimal storage," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 331-337, December.
    7. Federico S. Mandelman, 2006. "Business cycles: a role for imperfect competition in the banking system," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2006-21, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    8. Judith A. Chevalier & Anil K. Kashyap & Peter E. Rossi, 2003. "Why Don't Prices Rise During Periods of Peak Demand? Evidence from Scanner Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 15-37, March.
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    12. Mandelman, Federico S., 2010. "Business cycles and monetary regimes in emerging economies: A role for a monopolistic banking sector," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 122-138, May.
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