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The Optimal Income Taxation of Couples

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Author Info
Henrik Jacobsen Kleven
Claus Thustrup Kreiner
Emmanuel Saez

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the optimal income tax treatment of couples. Each couple is modelled as a single rational economic agent supplying labor along two dimensions: primary and secondary earnings. We consider fully general joint income tax systems. Separate taxation is never optimal if social welfare depends on total couple incomes. In a model where secondary earners make only a binary work decision (work or not work), we demonstrate that the marginal tax rate of the primary earner is lower when the spouse works. As a result, the tax distortion on the secondary earner decreases with the earnings of the primary earner and actually vanishes to zero asymptotically. Such negative jointness is optimal because redistribution from two-earner toward one-earner couples is more valuable when primary earner income is lower. We also consider a model where both spouses display intensive labor supply responses. In that context, we show that, starting from the optimal separable tax schedules, introducing some negative jointness is always desirable. Numerical simulations suggest that, in that model, it is also optimal for the marginal tax rate on one earner to decrease with the earnings of his/her spouse. We argue that many actual redistribution systems, featuring family-based transfers combined with individually-based taxes, generate schedules with negative jointness.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 12685.

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Date of creation: Nov 2006
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12685

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H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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References listed on IDEAS
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  5. Emmanuel Saez, 2002. "Optimal Income Transfer Programs: Intensive Versus Extensive Labor Supply Responses," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(3), pages 1039-1073, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Boskin, Michael J. & Sheshinski, Eytan, 1983. "Optimal tax treatment of the family: Married couples," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 281-297, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. J. A. Mirrlees, 1976. "Optimal Tax Theory: A Synthesis," Working papers 176, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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  8. James Alm & Stacy Dickert-Conlin & Leslie A. Whittington, 1999. "Policy Watch: The Marriage Penalty," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(3), pages 193-204, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Diamond, Peter A, 1998. "Optimal Income Taxation: An Example with a U-Shaped Pattern of Optimal Marginal Tax Rates," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 83-95, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Blundell, Richard & Macurdy, Thomas, 1999. "Labor supply: A review of alternative approaches," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1559-1695 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1996. "Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 139-58, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1988. "Rational Household Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 63-90, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Herwig Immervoll & Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Claus Thustrup Kreiner & Nicolaj Verdelin, 2008. "An Evaluation of the Tax-Transfer Treatment of Married Couples in European Countries," EPRU Working Paper Series 08-03, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Alberto Alesina & Andrea Ichino & Loukas Karabarbounis, 2007. "Gender Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores," IZA Discussion Papers 3233, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. François Bourguignon & Amedeo Spadaro, 2008. "Tax-benefit revealed social preferences," PSE Working Papers 2008-37, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Ruud Mooij, 2008. "Reinventing the Dutch tax-benefit system: exploring the frontier of the equity-efficiency trade-off," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 87-103, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Helmuth Cremer & Jean-Marie Lozachmeur & Pierre Pestieau, 2007. "Income Taxation of Couples and the Tax Unit Choice," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  6. Volker Meier & Matthias Wrede, 2008. "Reducing the Excess Burden of Subsidizing the Stork: Joint Taxation, Individual Taxation, and Family Tax Splitting," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  7. Ruud de Mooij, 2007. "Reinventing the Dutch tax-benefit system," CPB Discussion Papers 88, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. [Downloadable!]
  8. Haan, Peter & Navarro, Dolores, 2008. "Optimal Income Taxation of Married Couples: An Empirical Analysis of Joint and Individual Taxation," IZA Discussion Papers 3819, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  9. Peter Haan & Dolores Navarro, 2008. "Optimal Income Taxation of Married Couples: An Empirical Analysis of Joint and Individual Taxation," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 838, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  10. Patricia Apps, 2009. "Tax Reform, Targeting and the Tax Burden on Women," CEPR Discussion Papers 609, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. [Downloadable!]
  11. Clément Carbonnier, 2008. "Spouse labor supply: fiscal incentive and income effect,evidence from French fully joint income tax system," THEMA Working Papers 2008-20, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
  12. Rolf Aaberge & Ugo Colombino, 2008. "Designing Optimal Taxes with a Microeconometric Model of Household Labour Supply," CHILD Working Papers wp06_08, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY. [Downloadable!]
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