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The Dynamic (In)efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee

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Author Info
RIBONI, Alessandro
RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco

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Abstract

This paper develops a model where the value of the monetary policy instrument is selected by a heterogenous committee engaged in a dynamic voting game. Committee members differ in their institutional power and, in certain states of nature, they also differ in their preferred instrument value. Preference heterogeneity and concern for the future interact to generate decisions that are dynamically ineffcient and inertial around the previously-agreed instrument value. This model endogenously generates autocorrelation in the policy variable and provides an explanation for the empirical observation that the nominal interest rate under the central bank’s control is infrequently adjusted.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 2006-02.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mtl:montde:2006-02

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Related research
Keywords: Committees; status-quo bias; interest-rate smoothing; dynamic voting;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Richard Clarida & Jordi Gali & Mark Gertler, 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1661-1707, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Orphanides, Athanasios, 2003. "Monetary policy evaluation with noisy information," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 605-631, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(3), pages 651-78, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Michael Woodford, 2003. "Optimal Interest-Rate Smoothing," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 70(4), pages 861-886, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel & Luis Rayo, 2006. "The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(5), pages 1161-1190, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Eijffinger, S. & Schaling, E. & Verhagen, W., 1999. "A theory of interest rate stepping: inflation targeting in a dynamic menu cost model," Discussion Paper 71, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Blinder, Alan S & Morgan, John, 2005. "Are Two Heads Better than One? Monetary Policy by Committee," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(5), pages 789-811, October.
  8. Anne Sibert, 2003. "Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 70(3), pages 649-665, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Robert L. Hetzel, 1998. "Arthur Burns and inflation," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 21-44. [Downloadable!]
  10. Christopher J. Waller, 2000. "Policy Boards And Policy Smoothing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(1), pages 305-339, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. William English & William Nelson & Brian Sack, 2003. "Interpreting the Significance of the Lagged Interest Rate in Estimated Monetary Policy Rules," Contributions to Macroeconomics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1073-1073. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Alex Cukierman, 1989. "Why does the Fed smooth interest rates?," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, pages 111-157.
  13. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1998. "Sources of Inefficiency in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 139-56, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Helge Berger & Volker Nitsch & Tonny Lybek, 2006. "Central Bank Boards Around the World: Why Does Membership Size Differ?," IMF Working Papers 06/281, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Carlos Montoro, 2007. "Why Central Banks Smooth Interest Rates? A Political Economy Explanation," Working Papers 2007-003, Banco Central de Reserva del Perú. [Downloadable!]
  3. Carlos Montoro, 2007. "Monetary Policy Committees and Interest Rate Smoothing," CEP Discussion Papers dp0780, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  4. Etienne Farvaque & Norimichi Matsueda & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2008. "How monetary policy committees impact the volatility of policy rates," Working Papers CEB 08-026.RS, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Centre Emile Bernheim (CEB). [Downloadable!]
  5. Helge Berger & Volker Nitsch, 2008. "Too Many Cooks? Committees in Monetary Policy," Working papers 08-195, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Helge Berger, 2006. "Optimal Central Bank Design: Benchmarks for the ECB," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  7. Brooks, Robert & Harris, Mark & Spencer, Christopher, 2007. "An Inflated Ordered Probit Model of Monetary Policy: Evidence from MPC Voting Data," MPRA Paper 8509, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-1.

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