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Price Setting in a Decentralized Market and the Competitive Outcome

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Author Info
Stephan Lauermann () (University of Bonn)
Abstract

This paper studies a decentralized, dynamic matching and bargaining market: buyers and sellers are matched into pairs. Traders exit the market at a constant rate, inducing search costs (frictions). All price offers are made by sellers. Despite the fact that sellers have all the bargaining power we show that they set competitive prices in the limit when frictions become small. Previous literature has restricted the sellers' bargaining power. We dispense with this restriction and show that the convergence result does not depend on the distribution of bargaining power. Our model allows us to isolate basic market clearing forces that ensure the competitive outcome in the frictionless limit. For the particular case of homogeneous sellers we characterize the equilibrium price by the familiar Lerner formula. We use this formula to provide comparative static results of the decentralized trading outcome with respect to the level of the search frictions.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods in its series Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods with number 2008_06.

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Length: 49 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2008_6

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Related research
Keywords: Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games Decentralized Markets Non-cooperative Foundations of Competitive Equilibrium Search Frictions Rationing

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Perfect Competition
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Paul Milgrom & Ilya Segal, 2002. "Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 583-601, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Alp E. Atakan, 2006. "Competitive Equilibria in Decentralized Matching with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 1437, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  3. Dale T. Mortensen & Randall Wright, 2002. "Competitive Pricing and Efficiency in Search Equilibrium," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(1), pages 1-20, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Milgrom, Paul & Shannon, Chris, 1994. "Monotone Comparative Statics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(1), pages 157-80, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Igal Hendel & Aviv Nevo, 2006. "Measuring the Implications of Sales and Consumer Inventory Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(6), pages 1637-1673, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Shneyerov, Art & Wong, Adam Chi Leung, 2007. "Bilateral Matching and Bargaining with Private Information," Micro Theory Working Papers shneyerov-07-05-01-03-38-, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 01 May 2007. [Downloadable!]
  7. Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1985. "Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1133-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Satterthwaite, Mark & Shneyerov, Artyom, 2003. "Convergence of a Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Market with Two-sided Incomplete Information to Perfect Competition," Micro Theory Working Papers shneyerov-03-12-17-09-36-, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 17 Dec 2003. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. McAfee, R Preston, 1993. "Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1281-1312, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Yilankaya, Okan, 1999. "A Note on the Seller's Optimal Mechanism in Bilateral Trade with Two-Sided Incomplete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 267-271, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Gianni De Fraja & Jozsef Sakovics, 2004. "Walras Retrouve: Decentralized Trading Mechanisms and the Competitive Price," ESE Discussion Papers 36, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Disagreement in Markets with Matching and Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(1), pages 177-85, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Serrano, Roberto, 2002. "Decentralized information and the Walrasian outcome: a pairwise meetings market with private values," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 65-89, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Mark Satterthwaite & Artyom Shneyerov, 2007. "Dynamic Matching, Two-Sided Incomplete Information, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(1), pages 155-200, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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