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Erwartungsbildung über den Wahlausgang und ihr Einfluss auf die Wahlentscheidung

Author

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  • Huber, Sascha
  • Gschwend, Thomas
  • Meffert, Michael F.
  • Pappi, Franz Urban

Abstract

Erwartungen über den Wahlausgang haben einen festen Platz sowohl in Rational-Choice-Theorien des Wählerverhaltens als auch in stärker sozialpsychologisch orientierten Ansätzen. Die Bildung von Erwartungen und ihr Einfluss auf die Wahlentscheidung ist dabei jedoch ein noch relativ unerforschtes Gebiet. In diesem Beitrag werden anhand von Wahlstudien für Belgien, Österreich und Deutschland verschiedene Fragen der Erwartungsbildung und ihrer Auswirkungen untersucht. Zunächst wird die Qualität der Gesamterwartungen analysiert und verschiedene Faktoren identifiziert, die einen systematischen Einfluss auf die Erwartungsbildung haben. Im zweiten Schritt wenden wir uns den Einzelerwartungen über verschiedene Parteien und Koalitionen zu und finden eine moderate Verzerrung zugunsten der präferierten Parteien und Koalitionen. Dabei kann gezeigt werden, dass der Effekt des Wunschdenkens mit dem politischen Wissen und dem Bildungsgrad abnimmt. Schließlich werden in einem letzten Schritt zwei unterschiedliche Logiken für die Auswirkungen von Erwartungen getestet, das rationale Kalkül des koalitionsstrategischen Wählens zur Vermeidung der Stimmenvergeudung sowie der sozialpsychologisch begründete Bandwagon-Effekt. Das Ausmaß an politischem Wissen scheint dabei eine zentrale vermittelnde Variable zwischen den beiden Logiken zu sein.

Suggested Citation

  • Huber, Sascha & Gschwend, Thomas & Meffert, Michael F. & Pappi, Franz Urban, 2008. "Erwartungsbildung über den Wahlausgang und ihr Einfluss auf die Wahlentscheidung," Papers 08-01, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
  • Handle: RePEc:mnh:spaper:2310
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    References listed on IDEAS

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