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Democratization or Repression?

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Author Info
Daron Acemoglu () (MIT Department of Economics)
James Robinson () (Department of Political Science, Universite of California, Berkeley, and Hoover Institute, Stanford University)

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Abstract

Regimes controlled by a rich elite often collapse and make way for democracy amidst widespread social unrest. Such regime changes are often followed by redistribution to the poor at the expense of the former elite. We argue that the reason why the elite may have to resort to full-scale democratization, despite its apparent costs to themselves, may be that lesser concessions would be viewed as a sign of weakness and spur further unrest and more radical demands. The elite may therefore be forced to choose between repression and the most generous concession, a transition to full democracy.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics in its series Working papers with number 99-27.

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Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: Nov 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mit:worpap:99-27

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  1. Howard Petith, 2007. "The Rise of Democracy in Europe and the Fight Against Mass Poverty in Latin America: The Implications for Marxist Thought of Some Recent Mainstream Papers," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 684.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
  2. Christophe Ehrhart, 2009. "The effects of inequality on growth: a survey of the theoretical and empirical literature," Working Papers 107, ECINEQ, Society for the Study of Economic Inequality. [Downloadable!]
  3. Ruth Uwaifo Oyelere, 2007. "Within and Between Gender Disparities in Income and Education Benefits from Democracy," IZA Discussion Papers 3221, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  4. Howard Petith, 2007. "Marxian Insights from the Mainstream," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 685.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
  5. Mohtadi, Hamid & Roe, Terry, 2001. "Democracy, Rent Seeking, Public Spending And Growth," Bulletins 12981, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Howard Petith, 2007. "Sobre "Clase y Explotación" en la Corriente Principal de la Economía," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 688.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
  7. Uwaifo Oyelere, Ruth, 2008. "Understanding Low Average Returns to Education in Africa: The Role of Heterogeneity across Education Levels and the Importance of Political and Economic Reforms," IZA Discussion Papers 3766, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  8. A. Dalmazzo & Guido De Blasio, 2001. "Resources and Incentives to Reform: A Model and Some Evidence on Sub-Saharan African Countries," IMF Working Papers 01/86, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  9. Petros G. Sekeris, 2008. "Preference Falsification and Patronage," CEDI Discussion Paper Series 08-18, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University. [Downloadable!]
  10. Jeremy Grant & Thomas Kirchmaier, 2004. "Corporate Ownership Structure and Performance in Europe," CEP Discussion Papers dp0631, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  11. Asoni, Andrea, 2008. "Protection of Property Rights and Growth as Political Equilibria," Working Paper Series 737, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
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