We consider an economy where property rights are necessary to ensure sufficient rewards to ex ante investments. Because enforcement of property rights influence the ex post distribution of rents, there is room for corruption. We characterize the optimal organization of the society and optimal degree of property right enforcement subject to incentive constraints of the agents. We find that three frequently mentioned government failures arise quite naturally as part of the optimal mechanism; (i) rents for government employees, (ii) corruption, and (iii) misallocation of talent.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics in its series Working papers with number
96-5.
Length: 29 pages Date of creation: 1996 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:mit:worpap:96-5
Contact details of provider: Postal: MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (MIT), DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, 50 MEMORIAL DRIVE CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS 02142 USA Phone: (617) 253-3361 Fax: (617) 253-1330 Web page: http://econ-www.mit.edu/ More information through EDIRC
Order Information: Postal: MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (MIT), DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, 50 MEMORIAL DRIVE CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS 02142 USA Email:
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Linda Woodbury).
Find related papers by JEL classification: D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.) This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.