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The Alternative to Equilibrium Existence

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Author Info
David Rahman () (Department of Economics, University of Minnesota)

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Abstract

This paper establishes and interprets a necessary and sucient condition for existence of (countably additive) correlated equilibrium in n-person games, assuming only that utility functions are bounded, measurable. A sequence of deviation profiles is consistent if there exists a correlated strategy that makes every profile in the sequence unprofitable with respect to the sum of utilities. An equilibrium exists if and only if every sequence of deviation profiles has a consistent subsequence. This condition fails to characterize Nash equilibrium. As a direct corollary, existence of (communication) equilibrium is characterized in games with incomplete information on type spaces large enough to include the universal one. Exact conditions for existence of approximate correlated equilibrium are also obtained, as well as a value for two-person zero-sum games.

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File URL: http://www.econ.umn.edu/merr/2009_1.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2008
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Minnesota, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2009-1.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 10 Mar 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:min:wpaper:2009-1

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Related research
Keywords: correlated equilibrium; consistency; duality; discontinuous games.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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This page was last updated on 2009-10-30.

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