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A Unified Approach to Equilibrium Analysis in Competing Mechanism Games

Author

Listed:
  • Seungjin Han
  • Siyang Xiong

Abstract

This paper provides a unified approach to equilibrium analysis in models for competing mechanisms (e.g., Szentes (2009), Yamashita (2010)), which may differ in terms of delegation of action choice, announcement of mechanisms, observability of messages, and equilibrium notions.

Suggested Citation

  • Seungjin Han & Siyang Xiong, 2021. "A Unified Approach to Equilibrium Analysis in Competing Mechanism Games," Department of Economics Working Papers 2021-09, McMaster University.
  • Handle: RePEc:mcm:deptwp:2021-09
    as

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    File URL: http://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/econ/rsrch/papers/archive/2021-09.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pavan, Alessandro & Calzolari, Giacomo, 2009. "Sequential contracting with multiple principals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 503-531, March.
    2. Michael Peters, 2014. "Competing mechanisms," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(2), pages 373-397, May.
    3. Michael Peters, 2014. "Competing mechanisms," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 47(2), pages 373-397, May.
    4. Han, Seungjin, 2007. "Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 610-626, November.
    5. Takuro Yamashita, 2010. "Mechanism Games With Multiple Principals and Three or More Agents," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(2), pages 791-801, March.
    6. Peters, Michael, 2014. "Competing Mechanisms," Microeconomics.ca working papers michael_peters-2014-7, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 19 Feb 2014.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Han, Seungjin, 2022. "General competing mechanism games with strategy-proof punishment," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    competing mechanisms; unified equilibrium analysis; multiple principals;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other

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