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The political reception of innovations

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  • Jeffry Frieden
  • Arthur Silve

Abstract

Why do some societies embrace innovative technologies, policies, and ideas, while others are slow to adopt, or even resist, them? We focus on features of an innovation that are expected to affect the incumbent elite's economic activities, and hence the elite's reaction. The elite can choose whether to appropriate the innovation for itself; encourage its adoption; tax, regulate, or limit or block it. Six features of the innovation affect the elite response: i) whether it is easy to replicate; ii) whether it complements or competes with the elite's sources of income; iii) whether its impact is broad or narrow; iv) whether it is location-dependent, and v) concealable; vi) whether it requires large fixed costs. Some of these factors have been considered in other work; here we assess them together. We provide illustrative evidence of the relevance and generality of the model to understand the fate of a variety of innovations.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeffry Frieden & Arthur Silve, 2021. "The political reception of innovations," Cahiers de recherche 2105, Centre de recherche sur les risques, les enjeux économiques, et les politiques publiques.
  • Handle: RePEc:lvl:crrecr:2105
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    : innovation; regulation; rent-seeking;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
    • O30 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - General

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