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Asymmetric majority pillage games

Author

Listed:
  • Manfred Kerber

    (University of Birmingham)

  • Colin Rowat

    (University of Birmingham)

  • Naoki Yoshihara

    (School of Economics and Management, Kochi University of Technology)

Abstract

This paper studies pillage games (Jordan in J Econ Theory 131.1:26-44, 2006, “Pillage and property†), which are well suited to modelling unstructured power contests. To enable empirical test of pillage games’ predictions, it relaxes a symmetry assumption that agents’ intrinsic contributions to a coalition’s power is identical. In the three-agent game studied: (i) only eight configurations are possible for the core, which contains at most six allocations; (ii) for each core configuration, the stable set is either unique or fails to exist; (iii) the linear power function creates a tension between a stable set’s existence and the interiority of its allocations, so that only special cases contain strictly interior allocations. Our analysis suggests that non-linear power functions may o er better empirical tests of pillage game theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Manfred Kerber & Colin Rowat & Naoki Yoshihara, 2019. "Asymmetric majority pillage games," Working Papers SDES-2019-10, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Nov 2019.
  • Handle: RePEc:kch:wpaper:sdes-2019-10
    as

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    File URL: http://www.souken.kochi-tech.ac.jp/seido/wp/SDES-2019-10.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Manfred Kerber & Colin Rowat, 2011. "A Ramsey bound on stable sets in Jordan pillage games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(3), pages 461-466, August.
    2. Thomas F. Hellmann & Noam Wasserman, 2011. "The First Deal: The Division of Founder Equity in New Ventures," NBER Working Papers 16922, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Rowat, Colin & Kerber, Manfred, 2014. "Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 69-80.
    4. Beardon, Alan F. & Rowat, Colin, 2013. "Efficient sets are small," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 367-374.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    power contests; core; stable sets;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
    • P14 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Property Rights

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