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On The Coincidence Of The Feedback Nash And Stackelberg Equilibria In Economic Applications Of Differential Games

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  • Santiago J. Rubio

    (Universitat de València)

Abstract

In this paper the scope of the applicability of the Stackelberg equilibrium concept in differential games is investigated. Firstly, it is showed that for a class of differential games with state-interdependence the stationary feedback Nash equilibrium coincides with the stationary feedback Stackelberg equilibrium independently of the player being the leader of the game. Secondly, sufficient conditions for obtaining the coincidence between the two equilibria are defined. A review of different economic models shows that this coincidence is going to occur for a good number of economic applications of differential games. This result appears because of the continuous-time setting in which differential games are defined. In this setting the first movement advantage of the leader may disappears and then both equilibria coincide.

Suggested Citation

  • Santiago J. Rubio, 2002. "On The Coincidence Of The Feedback Nash And Stackelberg Equilibria In Economic Applications Of Differential Games," Working Papers. Serie AD 2002-11, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    • Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2002-11
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    Cited by:

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    2. Guiomar Martín-Herrán & Santiago J. Rubio, 2016. "The Strategic Use of Abatement by a Polluting Monopoly," Working Papers 2016.58, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    3. Karray, Salma & Martín-Herrán, Guiomar, 2009. "A dynamic model for advertising and pricing competition between national and store brands," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 193(2), pages 451-467, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Differential Games; Stationary Feedback Nash Equilibrium; Stationary Feedback Stackelberg Equilibrium; Coincidence.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • Q30 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - General

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