This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Some reflections on the economics of prosecutors: Mandatory v selective prosecution

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Nuno Garoupa () (University of Illinois and IMDEA Social Sciences)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Mandatory prosecution is inefficient according to legal economists. We argue that when prosecutors are fairly insulated from their performance or are highly risk averse mandatory prosecution is better than selective prosecution. This result has important implications for comparative law since mandatory prosecution generally prevails in civil law jurisdictions whereas selective prosecution is typical of common law jurisdictions.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://repec.imdea.org/pdf/imdea-wp2008-04.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales in its series Working Papers with number 2008-04.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 07 Feb 2008
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in International Review of Law and Economics
Handle: RePEc:imd:wpaper:wp2008-04

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Vel�quez 76, 28001 Madrid
Phone: +34917816570
Fax: +34916766052
Email:
Web page: http://www.imdea.org/Institutos/CienciasSociales/tabid/300/Default.aspx
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (IMDEA RePEc Maintainer).

Related research
Keywords: prosecutors; mandatory prosecution; selective prosecution; civil law; common law;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Landes, William M, 1971. "An Economic Analysis of the Courts," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(1), pages 61-107, April.
  2. Boari, Nicola & Fiorentini, Gianluca, 2001. "An economic analysis of plea bargaining: the incentives of the parties in a mixed penal system," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 213-231, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Froeb, Luke M. & Kobayashi, Bruce H., 2001. "Evidence production in adversarial vs. inquisitorial regimes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 267-272, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Palumbo, Giuliana, 2006. "Optimal duplication of effort in advocacy systems," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 112-128, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Anne van Aaken & Eli Salzberger & Stefan Voigt, 2003. "The Prosecution of Public Figures and the Separation of Powers: Confusion within the Executive Branch. A Conceptual Framework," ICER Working Papers 32-2003, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Bjerk, David, 2005. "Making the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion under Mandatory Minimum Sentencing," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(2), pages 591-625, October.
    Other versions:
  7. Parisi, Francesco, 2002. "Rent-seeking through litigation: adversarial and inquisitorial systems compared," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 193-216, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Springer Verlag was the first commercial publisher to be listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-4.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.