This article is a brief survey on the Nash program for coalitional games. Results of noncooperative implementation of the Nash solution, the Shapley value and the core are discussed.
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Paper provided by Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales in its series Working Papers with number
2007-05.
Length: Date of creation: 28 Feb 2007 Date of revision: Publication status: Published in Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence Blume (eds.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition, London: McMillan Handle: RePEc:imd:wpaper:wp2007-05
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1994.
"Bargaining and Value,"
Economics Working Papers
114, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Feb 1995.
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