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Diseño de la Subasta Optima para el Seguro de Invalidez y Sobreviviencia en Chile

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Abstract

Este artículo estudia la forma óptima de implementar el proceso de adjudicación del seguro de invalidez y sobrevivencia en Chile. Nuestro trabajo concluye que dadas las características con que fue diseñado el sistema de invalidez y sobrevivencia, y atendiendo a la estructura de la industria de seguros en el país, la subasta óptima es una combinación de subasta japonesa o (en este caso) descendente con salida en una primera etapa, con una subasta holandesa (primer precio sobre cerrado) en una segunda etapa. Nuestra propuesta considera las preocupaciones por la eficiencia de la subasta, las posibilidades de comportamientos anticompetitivos en ella, el deseo de favorecer la entrada de nuevos competidores y la siempre y necesaria simpleza de la propuesta. Más allá del interés particular en la subasta del Seguro de Invalidez y Sobrevivencia, el artículo presenta una revisión de la literatura de subastas accesible para no especialistas en el tema

Suggested Citation

  • Eduardo Saavedra & Manuel Willington, 2008. "Diseño de la Subasta Optima para el Seguro de Invalidez y Sobreviviencia en Chile," ILADES-UAH Working Papers inv209, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business.
    • Handle: RePEc:ila:ilades:inv209
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-392, June.
    2. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-19, October.
    3. Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521536721.
    4. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    5. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    6. John McMillan, 1994. "Selling Spectrum Rights," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 145-162, Summer.
    7. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gonzalo Reyes, 2009. "Diseño de mercado para la provisión de Seguridad Social: El Caso del Seguro de Invalidez y Sobrevivencia," Working Papers 30, Superintendencia de Pensiones, revised Sep 2009.
    2. Reyes, Gonzalo, 2010. "Market design for the provision of social insurance: the case of disability and survivors insurance in Chile," Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(3), pages 421-444, July.
    3. María Angélica Arbeláez & Jorge Humberto Botero & Alejandra González & Camila Salamanca, 2011. "Sostenibilidad del seguro previsional en Colombia," Working Papers Series. Documentos de Trabajo 9066, Fedesarrollo.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Subastas; Seguro de Invalidez y Sobrevivencia; Fondos de Pensiones;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors

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