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Inflation Band Targeting and Optimal Inflation Contracts

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Author Info
Niklas J. Westelius () (Hunter College)
Frederic S. Mishkin (Graduate School of Business Columbia University)

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Abstract

In this paper we examine how target ranges work in the context of a Barro-Gordon (1983) type model, in which the time-inconsistency problem stems from political pressures from the government. We show that target ranges turn out to be an excellent way to cope with the time-inconsistency problem, and achieve many of the benefits that arise under practically less attractive solutions such as the conservative central banker and optimal inflation contracts. Our theoretical model also shows how an inflation targeting range should be set and how it should respond to changes in the nature of shocks to the economy

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Hunter College: Department of Economics in its series Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers with number 416.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:htr:hcecon:416

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Related research
Keywords: Inflation Band Targeting; Inflation Contract; Time-inconsistent policy;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Richard Clarida & Jordi Gali & Mark Gertler, 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1661-1707, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Susan Athey & Andrew Atkeson & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2005. "The Optimal Degree of Discretion in Monetary Policy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(5), pages 1431-1475, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Marc P. Giannoni & Michael Woodford, 2003. "Optimal Interest-Rate Rules: I. General Theory," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000384, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Orphanides, Athanasios & Wieland, Volker, 2000. "Inflation zone targeting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(7), pages 1351-1387, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Svensson, Lars E O, 1995. "Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 1249, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2002. "Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661314, January.
  8. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Professor Lars E O Svensson, 2001. "Independent review of the operation of monetary policy in New Zealand," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 64, March. [Downloadable!]
  10. Robert Amano & Richard Black & Marcel Kasumovich, 1997. "A Band-Aid Solution to Inflation Targeting," Working Papers 97-11, Bank of Canada. [Downloadable!]
  11. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Fair, Ray C, 1978. "The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 60(2), pages 159-73, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Calvo, Guillermo A, 1978. "On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1411-28, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Alexander Bick & Dieter Nautz, 2008. "Inflation Thresholds and Relative Price Variability: Evidence from U.S. Cities," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 4(3), pages 61-76, September. [Downloadable!]
  2. Niklas J. Westelius, 2008. "Inflation Range Targets with Hard Edges," Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers 423, Hunter College: Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Toshitaka Sekine & Yuki Teranishi, 2008. "Inflation Targeting and Monetary Policy Activism," IMES Discussion Paper Series 08-E-13, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan. [Downloadable!]
  4. Meredith Beechey, 2006. "A closer look at the sensitivity puzzle: the sensitivity of expected future short rates and term premia to macroeconomic news," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2007-06, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  5. Roc Armenter & Martin Bodenstein, 2006. "Of nutters and doves," International Finance Discussion Papers 885, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  6. Alberto Locarno, 2007. "Imperfect Knowledge, Adaptive Learning, and the Bias Against Activist Monetary Policies," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(3), pages 47-85, September. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Alpanda, Sami & Honig, Adam, 2007. "Political Monetary Cycles and a New de facto Ranking of Central Bank Independence," MPRA Paper 5898, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  8. William Whitesell, 2005. "An inflation goal with multiple reference measures," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2005-62, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
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