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Monitoring by Peers or by Delegates? Joint Liability Loans and Moral Hazard

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Author Info
Jonathan Conning () (Hunter College, Department of Economics)

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Abstract

I analyze the conditions under which joint liability loans to encourage peer-monitoring would be offered and chosen instead of monitored individual liability alternatives on a competitive loan market when production and monitoring activities are costly and subject to moral hazard. The case for joint liability loans does not rest on an assumed monitoring or information advantage by borrowers but instead on a incentive diversification effect that cannot be replicated by outside intermediaries. Joint liability clauses are chosen to implement a preferred Nash equilibrium in a multi-agent, multi-task game, where each borrower must be given incentives to remain diligent as a financed entrepreneur and as a monitor of others. The framework can be shown to encompass earlier analyses based on costless monitoring and also allows for relative performance evaluation.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Hunter College: Department of Economics in its series Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers with number 407.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:htr:hcecon:407

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
O16 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment
G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Banerjee, Abhijit V & Besley, Timothy & Guinnane, Timothy W, 1994. "Thy Neighbor's Keeper: The Design of a Credit Cooperative with Theory and a Test," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(2), pages 491-515, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Jonathan Morduch, 1998. "Does Microfinance Really Help the Poor? New Evidence from Flagship Programs in Bangladesh," Working Papers 198, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Research Program in Development Studies.. [Downloadable!]
  3. Jain, Pankaj S., 1996. "Managing credit for the rural poor: Lessons from the Grameen Bank," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 79-89, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. LAFFONT, Jean-Jacques, 2000. "Collusion and Group Lending with Adverse Selection," IDEI Working Papers 95, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Kumar Aniket, 2005. "Sequential Group Lending with Moral Hazard," ESE Discussion Papers 136, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
  6. Ashok S. Rai & Tomas Sjostrom, . "Is Grameen Lending Efficient?," CID Working Papers 40, Center for International Development at Harvard University. [Downloadable!]
  7. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1995. "Group lending, repayment incentives and social collateral," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-18, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Beatriz Armendariz de Aghion & Christian Gollier, 1996. "Peer Grouping in An Adverse Selection Model," Discussion Papers 96-24 ISSN 1350-6722, University College London, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Diamond, Douglas W, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Yeon-Koo Che, 2002. "Joint Liability and Peer Monitoring under Group Lending," Contributions to Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 2(1), pages 1016-1016. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Christian Ahlin & Robert Townsend, 2002. "Using Repayment Data to Test Across Models of Joint Liability Lending," Working Papers 0227, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
  12. Varian, H.R., 1989. "Monitoring Agents With Other Agents," Papers 89-18, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  13. TIROLE, Jean, 1991. "Collusion and the Theory of Organizations," IDEI Working Papers 9, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  14. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
  15. Jonathan Conning & Michael Kevane, 2003. "Why isn't there more Financial Intermediation in Developing Countries?," Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers 214, Hunter College: Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1990. "Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets," World Bank Economic Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(3), pages 351-66, September.
  17. Holmstrom, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and the Real Sector," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(3), pages 663-91, August.
    Other versions:
  18. Arnott, Richard & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1991. "Moral Hazard and Nonmarket Institutions: Dysfunctional Crowding Out or Peer Monitoring?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 179-90, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Conning, Jonathan, 1999. "Outreach, sustainability and leverage in monitored and peer-monitored lending," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 51-77, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Mark M. Pitt & Shahidur R. Khandker, 1998. "The Impact of Group-Based Credit Programs on Poor Households in Bangladesh: Does the Gender of Participants Matter?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(5), pages 958-996, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Jonathan Morduch, 1999. "The Microfinance Promise," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1569-1614, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Maitreesh Ghatak & Timothy W. Guinnane, 1998. "The Economics of Lending with Joint Liability: Theory and Practice," Discussion Papers 98-16, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  23. Itoh, Hideshi, 1991. "Incentives to Help in Multi-agent Situations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 611-36, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Laux, Christian, 2001. "Limited-Liability and Incentive Contracting with Multiple Projects," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 514-26, Autumn.
  25. Mookherjee, Dilip, 1984. "Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(3), pages 433-46, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Jonathan Conning & Michael Kevane, 2003. "Why isn't there more Financial Intermediation in Developing Countries?," Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers 214, Hunter College: Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Rafael Gomez & Eric Santor, 2003. "Do Peer Group Members Outperform Individual Borrowers? A Test of Peer Group Lending Using Canadian Micro-Credit Data," Working Papers 03-33, Bank of Canada. [Downloadable!]
  3. Becchetti Leonardo & Pisani Fabio, 2006. "Microfinance with divisible investment projects," Departmental Working Papers 242, Tor Vergata University, CEIS. [Downloadable!]
  4. Becchetti Leonardo & Pisani Fabio, 2007. "Promoting access to credit for small uncollateralized producers: moral hazard, subsidies and local externalities under different group lending market structures," Departmental Working Papers 249, Tor Vergata University, CEIS. [Downloadable!]
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