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Public Employment and the Double Role of Bureaucrats

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Author Info
Dahlberg, Matz () (Department of Economics)
Mörk, Eva () (Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation)

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Abstract

Bureaucrats in the government sector have a double role since they are both suppliers and demanders of public employment; they are publicly employed (supply labor) and they have an important say in deciding the size of the municipal employment (demand labor). In this paper we present and estimate a theoretical model that focuses on this double role of bureaucrats. The predictions from the theoretical model are supported by our empirical results: The estimates, based on data from Swedish municipalities 1990–2002, show that wages have smaller effects on the demand for bureaucrats than on the demand for other types of public employees. Actually, wages have no significant effect on the number of bureaucrats the municipality employs.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Uppsala University, Department of Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 2005:3.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 20 Feb 2005
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Public Choice, 2006, pages 387-404.
Handle: RePEc:hhs:uunewp:2005_003

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Postal: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P. O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
Phone: + 46 18 471 25 00
Fax: + 46 18 471 14 78
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Web page: http://www.nek.uu.se/
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Related research
Keywords: Public employment; bureaucrats; dynamic model;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Bailey, Stephen J & Connolly, Stephen, 1998. " The Flypaper Effect: Identifying Areas for Further Research," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(3-4), pages 335-61, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Dahlberg, Matz & Johansson, Eva, 1998. "The Revenues-Expenditures Nexus: Panel Data Evidence from Swedish Municipalities," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 30(10), pages 1379-86, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Borge, Lars-Erik & Rattso, Jorn, 1993. "Dynamic Responses to Changing Demand: A Model of the Reallocation Process in Small and Large Municipalities in Norway," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 25(5), pages 589-98, May.
  4. Breton, Albert & Wintrobe, Ronald, 1975. "The Equilibrium Size of a Budget-maximizing Bureau: A Note on Niskanen's Theory of Bureaucracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(1), pages 195-207, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Courant, Paul N & Gramlich, Edward M & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1979. "Public Employee Market Power and the Level of Government Spending," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(5), pages 806-17, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Nickell, Stephen J, 1981. "Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(6), pages 1417-26, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Romer, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard, 1979. "Bureaucrats versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 563-87, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Dahlberg, Matz & Lindstrom, Tomas, 1998. "Are Local Governments Governed by Forward Looking Decision Makers?: An Investigation of Spending Patterns in Swedish Municipalities," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 254-271, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Bergstrom, Pal & Dahlberg, Matz & Mork, Eva, 2004. "The effects of grants and wages on municipal labour demand," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 315-334, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Dahlberg, Matz & Johansson, Eva, 1997. "An Examination of the Dynamic Behavior of Local Governments Using GMM Bootstrapping Methods," Working Paper Series 1997:11, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  11. Dixit, Avinash K & Londregan, John, 1994. "The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics," CEPR Discussion Papers 1054, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Romer, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard, 1982. "Median Voters or Budget Maximizers: Evidence from School Expenditure Referenda," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(4), pages 556-78, October.
  13. Jorid Kalseth & Jørn Rattsø, 1998. "Political Control of Administrative Spending: The Case of Local Governments in Norway," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 10(1), pages 63-83, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Anderson, T. W. & Hsiao, Cheng., 1980. "Estimation of Dynamic Models with Error Components," Working Papers 336, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Berg, Lennart & Berger, Tommy, 2005. "The Q theory and the Swedish housing market –an empirical test," Working Paper Series 2005:19, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Johansson, Fredrik & Klevmarken, Anders, 2006. "Explaining the size and nature of response in a survey on health status and economic standard," Working Paper Series 2006:2, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Ahlin, Åsa & Mörk, Eva, 2005. "Effects of decentralization on school resources," Working Paper Series 2005:5, IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Söderström, Martin & Uusitalo, Roope, 2005. "School choice and segregation: evidence from an admission reform," Working Paper Series 2005:7, IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation. [Downloadable!]
  5. Dahlberg, Matz & Lundqvist, Heléne & Mörk, Eva, 2008. "Intergovernmental Grants and Bureaucratic Power," Working Paper Series 2008:12, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. John Gibson, 2007. "The Public Sector Pay Premium and Compensating Differentials in the New Zealand Labour Market," Working Papers in Economics 07/20, University of Waikato, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Chen, Jie, 2006. "The Dynamics of Housing Allowance Claims in Sweden: A discrete-time hazard analysis," Working Paper Series 2006:1, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  8. van den Berg, Gerard J & Lindeboom, Maarten & Dolton, Peter J, 2004. "Survey non-response and unemployment duration," Working Paper Series 2004:12, IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Engström, Per & Holmlund, Bertil, 2005. "Worker Absenteeism in Search Equilibrium," Working Paper Series 2005:22, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Svaleryd, Helena & Vlachos, Jonas, 2007. "Political Rents in a Non-Corrupt Democracy," Working Paper Series 698, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 26 Mar 2008. [Downloadable!]
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