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Incentives in the Welfare State

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  • Lindbeck, Assar

    (Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University)

Abstract

This paper deals with economic incentives and welfare-state arrangements in OECD countries; it also offers some lessons for would-be welfare states. These arrangements differ, of course, among OECD countries. In particular, there is wide variation in the extent to which countries rely on four basic institutions - the state, the firm, the family and the market. Countries also differ in their reliance on (i) a common safety net, often in the form of flat-rate benefits tied to specific contingencies; (ii) means-tested benefits for low-income groups; and (iii) income protection, i.e., benefits that are tied to previous income. Another distinction is between corporatist welfare states, where benefits are tied to labor contracts, and universal welfare states in which benefits are conditional on residence or citizenship. This distinction is blurred, however, by recent tendencies in corporatist welfare states to extend coverage to individuals who have very weak attachment to the labor market, and in universal welfare states to tie benefits to previous or contemporary work under the slogan “workfare” rather than “welfare”.

Suggested Citation

  • Lindbeck, Assar, 1997. "Incentives in the Welfare State," Seminar Papers 604, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:iiessp:0604
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    1. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09j0h08322p is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Weiss, Yoram & Fershtman, Chaim, 1998. "Social status and economic performance:: A survey," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 801-820, May.
    3. Michael Burda & Daniel Hamermesh & Philippe Weil, 2013. "Total work and gender: facts and possible explanations," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 26(1), pages 239-261, January.
    4. Fehr, Ernst & Falk, Armin, 2002. "Psychological foundations of incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 687-724, May.
    5. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09j0h08322p is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Hans-Werner Sinn, 1999. "Inflation and Welfare: Comment on Robert Lucas," NBER Working Papers 6979, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09j0h08322p is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Dufwenberg, Martin & Lundholm, Michael, 2001. "Social Norms and Moral Hazard," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(473), pages 506-525, July.
    9. Gerold Blümle & Friedrich Sell, 1998. "A positive theory of optimal personal income distribution and growth," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 26(4), pages 331-352, December.
    10. Kamila Fialová & OndÅej Schneider, 2009. "Labor Market Institutions and Their Effect on Labor Market Performance in the New EU Member Countries," Eastern European Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(3), pages 57-83, May.
    11. Hillman, Arye L. & Epstein, Gil S, 2000. "Social Harmony At The Boundaries Of The Welfare State: Immigrants And Social Transfers," CEPR Discussion Papers 2414, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Grossman, Herschel I. & Kim, Minseong, 2000. "Predators, moral decay, and moral revivals," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 173-187, June.
    13. Seliger Bernhard, 2001. "Die Krise der sozialen Sicherung und die Globalisierung – Politische Mythen und ordnungspolitische Wirklichkeit," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 52(1), pages 215-238, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    economic incentives; welfare-state arrangements;

    JEL classification:

    • I30 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General

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