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The men who weren't even there: Legislative voting with absentees

Author

Listed:
  • Laszlo A. Koczy

    (Institute of Economics - Hungarian Academy of Sciences)

  • Miklos Pinter

    (Department of Mathematics - Corvinus University Budapest)

Abstract

Voting power in voting situations is measured by the probability of changing decisions by altering the cast 'yes' or 'no' votes. Recently this analysis has been extended by strategic abstention. Abstention, just as 'yes' or 'no' votes can change decisions. This theory is often applied to weighted voting situations, where voters can cast multiple votes. Measuring the power of a party in a national assembly seems to fit this model, but in fact its power comprises of votes of individual representatives each having a single vote. These representatives may vote yes or no, or may abstain, but in some cases they are not even there to vote. We look at absentees not due to a conscious decision, but due to illness, for instance. Formally voters will be absent, say, ill, with a certain probability and only present otherwise. As in general not all voters will be present, a thin majority may quickly melt away making a coalition that is winning in theory a losing one in practice. A simple model allows us to differentiate between winning and more winning and losing and less losing coalitions reected by a voting game that is not any more simple. We use data from Scotland, Hungary and a number of other countries both to illustrate the relation of theoretical and effective power and show our results working in the practice.

Suggested Citation

  • Laszlo A. Koczy & Miklos Pinter, 2011. "The men who weren't even there: Legislative voting with absentees," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1129, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
  • Handle: RePEc:has:discpr:1129
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Laszlo A. Koczy & Balazs Sziklai, 2013. "Electing the Pope," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1315, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    2. László Á. Kóczy, 2018. "Partition Function Form Games," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, number 978-3-319-69841-0, March.
    3. Kóczy Á., László & Pintér, Miklós, 2011. "Az ellenzék ereje - általánosított súlyozott szavazási játékok [Minority power - generalized weighted voting games]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(6), pages 543-551.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    a priori voting power; power index; being absent from voting; minority; Shapley-Shubik index; Shapley value;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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