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Regard sur la ruse en économie

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  • Marc Deschamps

    (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE])

Abstract

Parce que l'économiste suppose généralement que l'agent économique est rationnel, il est évident que ce dernier cherchera par tous les moyens qui sont à sa disposition à satisfaire au mieux ses intérêts, y compris en utilisant la ruse. L'objet de cet article vise ainsi à éclairer quelques-unes des modalités que peut revêtir la notion de ruse en économie, sans évidemment prétendre en fournir une présentation exhaustive. A cette fin, nous choisissons de distinguer les situations où les agents économiques peuvent utiliser des ruses lorsqu'ils sont en concurrence entre eux (e.g stratégies mixtes en théorie des jeux, stratégies d'augmentation des coûts des concurrents), et celles où ils peuvent utiliser des ruses lorsqu'il s’agit de cas où le collectif est en jeu (e.g manipulation en matière de vote, demande et financement de biens publics).
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Marc Deschamps, 2019. "Regard sur la ruse en économie," Working Papers hal-04544293, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04544293
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://univ-fcomte.hal.science/hal-04544293
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Feldman, Allan M, 1979. "Manipulating Voting Procedures," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 17(3), pages 452-474, July.
    2. Marc Deschamps, 2009. "Comment affecter les concurrents grâce au Droit? Les stratégies d'augmentation des coûts des rivaux," Post-Print halshs-00859247, HAL.
    3. Marc Deschamps, 2010. "La stratégie anticoncurrentielle d'augmentation des coûts des rivaux à travers l'exemple du contrat de travail," Post-Print halshs-00859189, HAL.
    4. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    5. Gilles Grolleau & Naoufel Mzoughi, 2005. "L'élaboration des normes : un « nouvel » espace de compétition ? Une application à la norme ISO 14001," Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Programme National Persée, vol. 111(1), pages 29-56.
    6. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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