L'EVA et la théorie des incitations : une étude de cas

Though EVAâ has become a text book reference as a performance measure, there remains much to be learned about the actual implementation of the corresponding compensation systems. EVA systems have two distinguishable features : the use of an external standard related to the financial market (as opposed to more traditional (budget) internal systems) and the fact that EVA concerns the managers of profit centers and not only the top executives. This paper investigates an actual implementation of an EVA system through a case study. This case study provides detailed information on how the performance measure has been cascaded down in the organization and how the standards were constructed. After two years of operations the actual bonus paid by the system are analyzed as well as some qualitative feed back from the managers involved. Based on this case study, and as opposed to the general claims put forward by its advocates, it is argued that EVA systems do not by-pass the traditional congruence controllability dilemma that ordinarily applies to all compensation systems in firms. This analysis is consistent with the empirical limitations of EVA systems as reported in the literature.