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L'Influence Sur La Remuneration Des Dirigeants Des Liens Humains Entre Les Administrateurs Des Societes Cotees : Une Analyse Du Reseau Des Societes Cotees Au Sbf 250

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  • Ali Dardour

    (École doctorale de Sciences de Gestion - IAE - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises - Toulouse)

Abstract

This article aims to study the structure of the board's interlocks and its influence on the incentive compensation of the company first executive. A database of 181 executives of the SBF 250 companies between 2002 and 2005 is chosen. Our results show that board position in the network of human links, apprehended by the closeness centrality, has a positive impact on the executive incentive compensation. However, in contrast with our expectations, the executive "plurality of mandates" has no significant influence on the incentive part in its global compensation.

Suggested Citation

  • Ali Dardour, 2009. "L'Influence Sur La Remuneration Des Dirigeants Des Liens Humains Entre Les Administrateurs Des Societes Cotees : Une Analyse Du Reseau Des Societes Cotees Au Sbf 250," Post-Print halshs-00459365, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00459365
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00459365
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hee-Jung Yeo & Christine Pochet & Alain Alcouffe, 2003. "CEO Reciprocal Interlocks in French Corporations," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 7(1), pages 87-108, March.
    2. Hallock, Kevin F., 1997. "Reciprocally Interlocking Boards of Directors and Executive Compensation," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(3), pages 331-344, September.
    3. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
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