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Why Don't Foreign Firms Cooperate in U.S. Antidumping Investigations?: An Emperical Analysis

Author

Listed:
  • Michael Owen Moore

    (Department of Economics/Institute for International Economic Policy, George Washington University)

  • Alan Fox

    (U.S. International Trade Commission)

Abstract

Foreign firms face punitive duties if they do not cooperate with the US Department of Commerce (DOC) in antidumping procedures. For example, 37% of all foreign firms involved in antidumping investigations in the US chose faced facts available margins for the 1995-2002 period, with average antidumping duties of 31% for cooperating foreign firms, compared to 87% for those who do not. The existing literature has focused on how DOC discretion has led to foreign firm non-cooperation. This paper instead examines individual foreign firms decisions about whether to cooperate during this same period. We find evidence that non-cooperation is consistent with a model of foreign firms rationally choosing not to cooperate, rather than solely as a result of investigating authority bias against imports.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Owen Moore & Alan Fox, 2008. "Why Don't Foreign Firms Cooperate in U.S. Antidumping Investigations?: An Emperical Analysis," Working Papers 2008-17, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
  • Handle: RePEc:gwi:wpaper:2008-17
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bruce A. Blonigen, 2006. "Evolving discretionary practices of U.S. antidumping activity," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 39(3), pages 874-900, August.
    2. Moore, Michael O, 1992. "Rules or Politics? An Empirical Analysis of ITC Anti-dumping Decisions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(3), pages 449-466, July.
    3. Nelson, Douglas, 2006. "The political economy of antidumping: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 554-590, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Xenia Matschke & Anja Schöttner, 2013. "Antidumping as Strategic Trade Policy under Asymmetric Information," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 80(1), pages 81-105, July.
    2. Thomas J. Prusa & Robert Teh, 2010. "Protection Reduction and Diversion: PTAs and the Incidence of Antidumping Disputes," NBER Working Papers 16276, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Chad P. Bown, 2010. "China's WTO Entry: Antidumping, Safeguards, and Dispute Settlement," NBER Chapters, in: China's Growing Role in World Trade, pages 281-337, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Michael O. Moore, 2011. "Implementing Carbon Tariffs: A Fool’s Errand?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(10), pages 1679-1702, October.
    5. Chandra, Piyush & Long, Cheryl, 2013. "Anti-dumping Duties and their Impact on Exporters: Firm Level Evidence from China," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 169-186.
    6. Moore, Michael O., 2006. "U.S. facts-available antidumping decisions: An empirical analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 639-652, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    antidumping; commercial policy; trade policy; facts available;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F1 - International Economics - - Trade
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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