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Auctions with Endogenous Valuations: The Persistence of Monopoly Revisited

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Author Info
Krishna, K.

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Stockholm - International Economic Studies in its series Papers with number 472.

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Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: 1990
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:stocin:472

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Related research
Keywords: market ; economic models ; costs ; industry;

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  1. Sudip Gupta, 2004. "Endogenous Asymmetry and Entry in Sequential Multi-Unit Auctions: Identification and Estimation," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 566, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  2. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2005. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 142, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Yongmin Chen & Chuan He, 2006. "Paid Placement: Advertising and Search on the Internet," Working Papers 06-02, NET Institute, revised Sep 2006. [Downloadable!]
  4. Peter Cramton & Andrzej Skrzypacz & Robert Wilson, 2007. "Revenues in the 700 MHz Spectrum Auction," Papers of Peter Cramton 07rev700, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2007. [Downloadable!]
  5. Norbäck, Pehr-Johan & Persson, Lars, 2003. "Endogenous Asset Ownership Structures in Deregulated Markets," Working Paper Series 604, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Vijay Krishna & Robert Rosenthal, 1995. "Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies," Game Theory and Information 9503004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Hongjun Zhong, 2002. "postbid market interaction and auction choice," Microeconomics 0210002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  8. Ian Gale, 1994. "Competition for scarce inputs: the case of airport takeoff and landing slots," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q II, pages 18-25. [Downloadable!]
  9. Yongmin Chen & Ruqu Wang, 2005. "Market Design with Correlated Valuations," Working Papers 1034, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Gustavo Rodríguez, 1997. "Auctions of Licences and Market Structure," Economics Working Papers 209, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  11. James Dana & Kathryn Spier, 2007. "Entry Deterrence in a Duopoly Market," Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 7(1), pages 1653-1653. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Norbäck, Pehr-Johan & Persson, Lars, 2006. "The Organization of the Innovation Industry: Entrepreneurs, Venture Capitalists and Oligopolists," CEPR Discussion Papers 5449, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Vincent Crawford & Ping-Sing Kuo, 2000. "A Dual Dutch Auction in Taipei: The Choice of Numeraire and Auction Form in Multi-Object Auctions with Bundling," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2000-10, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Peter Eso & Volker Nocke & Lucy White, 2007. "Competition for Scarce Resources," Economics Series Working Papers 365, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  15. Czarnitzki, Dirk & Kraft, Kornelius, 2005. "License Expenditures of Incumbents and Potential Entrants : An Empirical Analysis of Firm Behavior," ZEW Discussion Papers 05-35, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  16. Essi Eerola & Niku Määttänen, 2003. "Strategic Alliances, Joint Investments, and Market Structure," Discussion Papers 871, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. James D. Dana & Kathryn Spier, 2000. "Entry Deterrence in a Duopoly Model," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1451, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  18. Onderstal, S., 2002. "Auctions for extra capacity in an oligopolistic market with network effects," Discussion Paper 33, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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