This paper questions the presumption that transferable quota licenses are worth more and result in higher welfare. We show that the price of a transferable license will tend to be higher than of its nontransferable counterpart only if the underlying quota is quite restrictive.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number
2-96-2.
Length: 32 pages Date of creation: 1996 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:pensta:2-96-2
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